ILLOCUTION OF DIRECT SPEECH ACTS VIA CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE AND SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION

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Abstract: The research introduces the notion of the additional illocution subdivided into illocution-expander, illocution-intensifier, and assessment illocution. Each component is characterized by a different type of correlations with conventional implicature and semantic presupposition. Two types of correlations have been specified: the match in meanings and triggers and the mediation by felicity conditions.

Keywords: direct speech act, compound illocution, illocution-expander, illocution-intensifier, assessment illocution, assessment perlocution, conventional implicature, semantic presupposition, felicity conditions.

1. Introduction

The study of relations within the implicit although structurally triggered pragmatic phenomena contributes to a better understanding of the specifics of implicit meaning and patterns of its inference. In this paper, we examine the implicit dimension and inference patterns of direct acts' illocution viewed through the triggers and meanings of other types of implicit conventional meanings, i.e. the implicatures and semantic presuppositions.

Certain correspondences between conventional implicature (hereinafter CI) and semantic presupposition (hereinafter SP) that are more or less obvious due to their common structural triggers were studied in (Karttunen & Peters 1979) having shown

that CIs are in fact presuppositions. Karttunen and Zaenen (2005) point out that in conditional sentences, presuppositions, and conventional implicatures appear to behave in the same way. Potts defines the conventional implicatures and conventional presuppositions as entailments that are context-free differentiating them from contextually determined conversational implicatures and pragmatic presuppositions (Potts 2005: 23).

However, Potts (2013: 28) and Horn (2007) assume that conventional implicatures differ from presuppositions in being new ones (presuppositions refer to established or old information, whereas CIs contribute novel information to the discourse, like at-issue content). According to Potts (2005), the difference between conventional implicatures and presuppositions is that the commitments made via conventional implicatures are "speaker-oriented" whereas the presupposition associated with factitive verbs concerns the truth of the embedded clause.

In respect to interrelation between conventional implicatures and speech acts some convincing results were obtained by Grice (1989), connecting CIs with the theory of performatives, and developed in further pragmatic studies (Bach 1999; 2012; Rieber 1997).

Ipso facto, similarity of direct speech acts' illocution, semantic presupposition and implicature, which are implicated but formally marked meanings, suggests their possible links. In this connection, we will extend the notion of illocution arguing that it may have a compound structure regardless of the direct or indirect nature of speech acts. To a certain degree, such suggestion is out of keeping with traditional distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. Thus, according to Searle's theory (Searle 1969), the compound nature of illocutionary force holds only for indirect speech acts, which have no direct relation to a sentence type and an illocutionary force. Following Searle, a generally accepted viewpoint is that indirect speech acts' illocution combines the "secondary" illocutionary act (the direct one, performed in the literal utterance of

the sentence) and "primary" illocutionary act (a speaker's utterance meaning that is not literally performed) (Searle 1969: 178).

However, a considerable part of speech acts with additional illocutionary meanings does not fit in the group of indirect acts since their additional illocution: (a) is triggered by formal markers and (b) does not change the illocutionary point of a speech act. Therefore, it is possible to assume that an illocution of direct speech acts (hereinafter IDSA) may have a compound structure. In support of this conjecture we can give a casual remark by Sadock that direct illocutionary force often is fairly complex (Sadock 2004: 4).

With that in mind, the paper makes a supposition that IDSA may incorporate subsidiary illocutionary goals corresponding to the illocution's components. The first constituent contributes to an additional propositional dimension of illocution referring to some particular aspects of a situation represented by speech acts. This constituent correlates with both conventional implicatures and semantic presuppositions in terms of conventionalized meaning and patterns of actualization.

The second parameter of illocution of direct acts derives from the interactive potential of every speech act involving (among other interactive tasks pertaining to the agreed meaning construction) the identification of interpersonal relationships. Such component of illocution may consist in the speaker's intention to be assessed as such who is sincere, capable to carry out some actions and acts in the hearer's interests (such components of speakers' evaluation roughly corresponds to felicity conditions of the particular acts). Assessment illocutionary component is optional since it may not be structurally marked and is strongly influenced by the context and situation.

The next part of the compound IDSA is an intended effect the speaker wants to exercise over the hearer. This component correlates with the speaker's intention to make the hearer recognize the intended perlocutionary act. Such perlocutionary effect of the

direct speech act results from a total of what is communicated, including the assessment and additional propositional aspects of the IDSA. The complex structure of illocution of direct speech acts determines the feasibility of the corresponding perlocutionary acts. Thus, an illocution component with evaluative meaning guides the assessment perlocutionary meaning, as a change in the hearer's believes or attitudes towards the speaker.

In my opinion, three aspect of the complex illocution are in line with inferential pragmatic model of communication introduced by Grice (1957; 1969) and neo-Gricean pragmatics (Horn 2007a; 2007b; Saul 2002) suggesting the compound structure of the speaker's intention.

In addition, our speculations in some degree correlate with three functional aspects (in other terms – three cognitive dimensions) of the speech acts distinguished by Sadock (1994: 393-407):
(a) a representational, which is defined in terms of propositions, that can be judged for accuracy against real or possible worlds (the aspect of additional structurally triggered illocutionary meanings);
(b) an affective, emotive aspect that is used to display genuine or feigned feelings and attitudes of the speaker (the aspect of the speaker's assessment against his motives, capabilities, sincerity, etc.);
(c) an effective, social aspect by means of which conventional effects of societally determined features of the world are achieved (an intended perlocutionary effect the speaker wants to exercise over the hearer).
Presumably, not all the hypothesized components simultaneously constitute DSAI, some of them might be missing or might be replaced by other constituents, which we intend to reveal as a part of our research.

The task of IDSA's parameterization determines the algorithm of the analysis manifested by the paper's structure. The first interplay relates to the assessment

illocutionary acts and their corresponding perlocutionary effects with reference to inferential pragmatic models. Then within the framework of additional illocutionary meanings we will identify some correlations between the direct illocution of speech acts and conventional implicature, on the one hand, and DSAI and semantic presupposition, on the other hand.

2. Database and methodology

The data analyzed in this paper include the direct speech acts taken from conversational, literary, and political discourses. Our primary concern has been to prove the IDSA's multidimensional structure, to identify its triggers and conditions of actualization based on illocution correlations with other types of implicit conventional meanings and their structural markers.

The principal aim of the article consists in multi-criteria categorization of illocution of direct acts in its relation to other pragmatic phenomena. Illocution might, therefore be specified as *"multiple reality"* mostly appropriate for qualitative research (for basics of qualitative research see: Lincoln & Guba 1985; Silverman 2001; Strauss & Corbin 1990).

The collected data are analyzed as follows:

The first step is identification of the direct speech acts, incorporating more than one illocutionary meanings. In that, we make use of speech act schema (Bach & Harnish 1979) for communicative illocutionary acts, that gears the inferences to mutual contextual beliefs of the communicators' and their presumption that act is performed with some recognizable illocutionary intent (Bach & Harnish 1979: 7). Consequently, we also involve explanatory tools provided by Grice's and neo-Gricean inferential pragmatics, aimed at inferencing of IDSA constituents.

The second step specifies the assessment illocutionary act. This illocutionary component is implied by the reflexive facet of a communicative intention aimed, inter

alia, at constructing or changing the hearer's believes or attitudes towards the speaker. Bach noticed that pragmatic intentions, which include subintentions depend on mutual contextual beliefs, beliefs about the hearer's beliefs, beliefs about the social and physical context, and the speaker's desires and beliefs (Bach 1984: 237). In this sense, the assessment illocution as an additional illocutionary meaning is consonant with ostensive-inferential communication (Sperber & Wilson 1986) as an attempt to create a genuinely mutual cognitive environment between social personae, modify their belief systems, which presumes a certain degree of trust of the listener to the speaker.

The inference of assessment illocution relies on certain structural triggers and contextual variables guiding the hearer's assessment of the motives, sincerity, qualities and capabilities of the speaker. Such triggers perform the function of the ostensive stimuli, giving rise to predictable expectations of the relevant perlocutionary reactions. As an additional tool to validate this part of compound illocution and in view of its correlation with a particular speech act felicity conditions, primarily the speaker's ability condition to perform a promised action and the hearer's benefit condition, we also made use of the conventional rules (felicity conditions) that are constitutive of a particular kind of act (Searle 1969: 36-37).

The third step is identification of an Illocution-expander as a lexicalized part of IDSA in direct assertives, which expands the basic assertive illocution by an additional propositional meaning. Conventional function-structure relationships indexing this type of additional meaning suggest the possibility of its analysis within the framework of conventional implicatures with regard to their common meanings and triggers (specified by Abbott 2000; Beaver & Condoravdi 2003; Cruse 1986; von Fintel 2004; Potts 2005; Simons 2001).

To a certain extent, we apply the mechanism of standardization introduced by Bach and Harnish (1979) and Bach (1998) in respect of conventionalized indirect speech acts. Such mechanism explains how the speaker's informative intention is inferable

without reference to the selection basis of the interpretation and an elaborate inference. The mechanism of standardization relies on the notion of the precedents, which are the means that are often used in the same particular ways, prompting knowledge about the way they are usually understood. The precedents streamline or shortcircuit the inference required on the part of the audience. The triggers of both semantic presuppositions and conventional implicatures are systematically used in the same particular ways with the same conventional meanings. Therefore, they constitute the precedents that streamline the inference of the Illocution-expander.

The next step is establishing an Illocution-intensifier, which is based on the patterns of correlation between the IDSA and conversational implicature in direct commissives and directives. In the inference of such additional illocution, we rely on adverbial modifiers and other means triggering the conventional implicature, which specify the felicity conditions of a particular speech act thus contributing to reinforcement of basic illocution.

The last step consists in specification of relationship between DSAI constituents, conventional implicatures, and semantic presuppositions.

At all levels of analysis we also rely on form / function pragmatics, which is concerned with the pragmatic meanings, conventionally associated with specific linguistic expressions (Ariel 2012: 30) as well as on Literal Force Hypothesis (Levinson 1983), suggesting that every utterance has an illocutionary force, which is built into its surface form. This hypothesis is slightly modified by our research to the extent that different structural triggers imply different IDSA constituents.

To explicate the IDSA as a complex structure of intended meanings of the speaker we will briefly refer to the foundations of the inferential pragmatic model of communication.

3. Compound illocution in a framework of inferential pragmatic model

According to Austin (1976), the action performed by producing an utterance consists of three related acts:

(a) Locutionary act is what the words say, a basic propositional content of the utterance.

(b) Illocutionary act is what the words do, the basic act of intention, performed *via* the communicative force of an utterance.

(c) Perlocutionary act is what the words result in, the effect of the utterance on the feelings, thoughts or actions of the hearer.

Comparing the structure of the direct speech acts to the inferential pragmatic model (first proposed by Grice in 1957), yields new insights into interpretation of the illocution and perlocution as the compound inferential phenomena.

According to inferential model of linguistic communication (Recanati 2004; Sperber & Wilson 1986; Strawson 1974), a transmission of information includes the coding and inferential phases. The coding and decoding of information are based on the interlocutors' common language code while inferential phase relies on the intention-recognition mediated by available cognitive contexts, act propositional content, and situational variables. When seen through this perspective the act of locution corresponds to the code phase based on the shared channel and language code. The illocutionary act as the speaker's intention behind the locution corresponds to the inferential phase based on both what is said and what is implicated. Perlocutionary act, presumably, corresponds to post-intentional and post-inferential phase "external" of the speaker's performance.

However, if based on the Grice's concept of intention as a complex structure, including an effect the speaker wants to exercise over the hearer (Grice 1957; 1969), perlocutionary act will constitute the phase of the compound intention. Following Grice, an intention aims to form the addressee's hypothesis both about the speaker's intention and the reaction expected from him, as well as to produce some effect on the

audience by means of recognition of intention. (Grice 1957; 1989: 220). The same idea was specified by Searle: "we achieve what we try to do by getting our audience to recognize what we try to do" (Searle 1969: 47).

An intended effect may manifest itself both in the form of verbal and cognitive response (a belief or other attitude towards speaker and denoted referent, which presupposes the recognition of the intention): "A uttered X with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention" (Grice 1957: 219). Such effect is also known as a "reflexive communicative intention" (Bach & Harnish 1979: 13).

These findings bring us to the preliminary conclusion about the complex nature of both intention and its corresponding perlocution as presupposing not only "physical" but also some cognitive hearer's response intended by the speaker as in (1-5).

(1) A. *Are you with me?* (Bellow 1970: 189).

B. I'm listening, go on, said Herzog.

In (1) the Illocution of A is composed of the two components: (a) the speaker's request to listen to her more carefully and (b) the speaker's request to be with her not only physically but also emotionally and psychologically. While the first part of such illocution intends (and actually obtains) the perlocution manifested by "physical" feedback from the hearer (the speech move showing his readiness to cooperate), the second part presumes some cognitive change in hearer's attitude towards the speaker. However, the latter does not exclude the possibility of mismatch between the speaker's illocution the hearer's inference (corresponding to the produced perlocution). In particular, unintended perlocutionary effect may consists in negative assessment of A against her motives and personal qualities: "she is too dominative; she wants to bring me under her control".

3.1 Assessment illocutionary and perlocutionary acts

In view of speech acts' interactive properties, suggested by inferential model of linguistic communication, a compound intention might include an assessment component – in view of the fact that interaction presumes not only the shared meaning development but also some identification of interpersonal relationships. This part of illocution involves the speaker's evaluation against his motives, capabilities, sincerity, etc. as in (1-5) and corresponds to the assessment perlocution as a change in the hearer's believes or attitudes towards the speaker. As Foolen suggests (2015: 241), "A mutual interest, a positive attitude and a bond of trust are necessary ingredients; otherwise the verbal interaction dies down quickly".

The analysis has shown that the assessment illocutionary component may result both from the primary illocution of indirect acts as in (1-2) and from additional illocution of the direct speech acts as in (3-5). It must be stressed that assessment part of illocution cannot prevent the unintended, unforeseen perlocutionary effect, which depends on situational constraints and the hearer's personality influencing the correct inference of the speaker's intention as in (1-5).

Assessment illocution and perlocution in indirect speech acts.

(2) *What you need is supervised rest* (Bellow 1970: 405).

Locutionary act: you need medical help.

Illocutionary act splits into three components:

Illocution 1 of directive (primary illocution) bases on the modal verb *need*: I advise you to go to a hospital.

Illocution 2 (additional illocution) relies on conventional implicature triggered by the euphemism *supervised rest:* you are sick.

Illocution 3 (additional illocution projecting perlocutionary assessment): I wish you only good; I want you to be healthy (mediated by benefit felicity condition for the hearer).

Perlocutionary act (intended by the speaker) splits into three constituents corresponding to compound illocution.

Perlocution 1 relates to the state of affairs: an intended effect is the hearer's readiness to cooperate (agreement to hospitalization).

Perlocution 2 relates to the hearer's self-evaluation: cognitive change in the hearer's believes (make him consider himself sick).

Perlocution 3 relates to the speaker's positive assessment: cognitive change in hearer's believes in speaker' reliability.

Perlocution 4 unintended by the speaker: speaker's negative assessment against his motives: He wants to get rid of me.

Assessment illocution and perlocution in direct speech acts.

(3) *I am still studying English.*

Illocution 1: basic illocutionary act: I am studying English currently.

Illocution 2: additional propositional illocutionary meanings triggered by *still.* I began studying English some time ago. I have not given up my studying English yet.

Assessment illocution intended by the speaker in order to project perlocutionary assessment: the speaker's assessment against his personal qualities (commitment to success, endurance).

Assessment perlocution: intended – the speaker's positive assessment;

unintended (unforeseen) – the speaker's negative assessment as being bad at languages or inefficient.

(4) *As your boss, I promise to promote you.*

Illocution 1: basic illocutionary act of a commissive: the speaker promises to affect somebody's promotion.

Illocution 2: additional propositional illocutionary meanings triggered by reference to the social status of the speaker (*as your boss*) confirming the capability to fulfill his / her commitment.

Assessment illocution intended by the speaker in order to project perlocutionary assessment: the speaker's assessment against his capabilities and reliability.

Perlocution corresponding to assessment illocution: positive attitude towards the speaker, confidence in him and his actions (based on the fact that the speaker satisfies the ability felicity conditions).

Perlocution unintended by the speaker: the speaker's negative assessment against his motives or personal qualities – e.g., overrates own capacities or plays up.

(5) *You should surely continue your studies*.

Illocution 1: basic illocutionary act of a directive – advice: the speaker advices to continue studies.

Illocution 2 projecting perlocutionary assessment: the speaker's awareness in performing his act in the hearer's interests (indexed by the intensifier *surely* with a particular inference pattern).

Perlocution corresponding to assessment illocution: Positive attitude towards the speaker, confidence in his action (based on the fact that the speaker satisfies the hearer's benefit felicity conditions).

Perlocution unintended by the speaker: the speaker's negative assessment – "it is none of his / her affairs".

It is evident from (4-5) that assessment illocution and its corresponding perlocution may rely on felicity conditions of speech acts – at least those of conditions that presume human agency, i.e., ability (as in 4) and benefit (as in 5) conditions (about felicity conditions – see 3.3.1).

The above presented analysis shows that the common feature of the indirect and direct speech acts' illocution consists in their compound (complex) structure, including literal component (secondary illocution in indirect acts and basic illocution in direct acts), additional illocutionary act ("primary" in indirect acts and lexicalized in direct acts) as well as an optional assessment illocution with the intended perlocutionary meaning (see Table.1). As distinct from the primary illocution, lexicalized illocution has particular structural triggers (bearing resemblance to the conventional implicature as we can see in 4.2) and does not transform the illocutionary point while extending the acts' informational structure.

Table 1. Constituents of the compound direct acts' illocution with their perlocutionary correlations

Compound direct acts' illocution	Compound direct acts' perlocution
Illocution 1: basic illocutionary act.	Perlocution 1: the act of Illocution 1 recognizing
Illocution 2: additional lexicalized illocutionary meaning triggered by structural markers.	Perlocution 2: verbal or other reaction expected by the Hearer as the result of the inference of Illocution 2
Illocution 3: the Speaker's intention to be assessed against his motives, sincerity, personal qualities and capabilities	Perlocution 3: the Speaker's positive assessment intended by Illocution 3 involving cognitive change in the Hearer's believes or attitudes towards the Speaker
	Perlocution 4 (unintended): the Speaker's negative assessment against his motives, sincerity, personal qualities and capabilities, which is context and situational dependent.

Since the lexicalized illocution expands the basic illocution by an additional propositional meaning, it seems to be appropriate to specify the former as an illocution-expander to differentiate it from other types of additional illocution (see below 4.3.1-2. and 5.1.1).

4. Direct acts with compound illocution and conventional implicature

The analysis of the data has shown that the illocution may have a compound structure regardless of direct or indirect nature of speech acts. Similar to illocution of indirect acts, compound illocution of direct acts incorporates both the explicated and implicated components. However, as distinct from indirect acts, IDSA is predictable and relies on conventional triggers of its implicated propositional dimension. To explicate the interaction between illocution of direct acts and conventional implicatures we will refer to some foundations of speech act theory, including the types of acts, criteria for their selection and successful use as well as to the Grice's theory of conventional and conversational implicatures.

4.1 Back to the foundations of speech act theory

Searle and Vanderveken (1985) suggest seven significant dimensions or constitutive rules to distinguish illocutionary acts. The most important among them are illocutionary point, direction of fit, and psychological state.

Illocutionary point is the characteristic aim of each type of speech acts: assertives describe how things are, commissives express the speaker's commitment to a future course of action, and directives attempt to get the hearer to do something. Two illocutions can have the same point but differ in degree of their strength. For instance, order and request have the same illocutionary point; however, the order is stronger than the request.

The direction of fit criterion manifests the vector of relation between words and their corresponding world. Some acts get the words fit the world and vice versa. Commissives are oriented towards making the world fit the words (a speaker becomes committed to fulfill his promises, i.e., bring them into line with a reality), while assertions have the words fitting the world (or believe) describing it.

Differences in the expressed psychological state relate to speaker's psychological state necessary for his / her act's accomplishment. For example, insincere promise is the promise that the speaker does not intend to perform.

Based on the above parameters Searle (1975) proposes taxonomy of illocutionary acts (also cited in Levinson 1983: 240; Yule 1996: 53-54).

Assertives: speech acts with assertive aim to describe a state of affairs by means of assertions (*I have a lot to do),* statements of fact (*The earth is round*), descriptions (*You are so beautiful*). While asserting, the speaker commits to the truth of the expressed proposition, the words here are supposed to fit the world. The psychological state expressed is that of belief. This category of speech acts includes boast, assertion,

claim, characterization, statement, diagnosis, classification, complaint, conclusion, deduction, prediction, description, and identification.

Directives: aimed to get the hearer to perform particular actions, e.g., requests, commands, orders, direct questions, invitations, advice, suggestions, challenges, insistence, prayers, dares, etc. (*You ought to have a talk with him*). The world here is assumed to fit the words (by his words the speaker gets the hearer to change a state of affairs).

Commissives: the speaker commits himself to some course of action in the near or far future as described by the propositional content. The speaker's intention is to make the world fit his words through promises, pledges, vows, oaths, etc. (*I promise to take care of your child*).

Expressives: express the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the proposition (greetings, apologies, thanks, congratulations, condolences, sorrows: *Oh, Ethel, forgive me. I'm so awfully ashamed of myself*). Therefore, they must necessarily meet the sincerity condition. There is no direction of fit between the world and the words.

Declaratives: attempt to change the reality by establishing new status of the designated object by means of performative verbs: fire, resign, appoint, excommunicate, christen, declare, name, call, define, abbreviate, give, bequeath one's possessions, marry, nominate, dub, etc. (*I sentence you to death; I pronounce you husband and wife*). With this kind of speech acts, the world is assumed to fit the words and *vice versa* (saying and doing are the same thing here). Unlike other speech acts, there is no sincerity condition.

4.2 Illocution-expander and conventional implicatures: relations of correspondence
Direct acts involve the direct relationship between the function (illocutionary point) of a speech act and its verbal structure mostly indicated by sentence forms and

performative verbs (Yule 2008:55) (about direct and indirect acts' distinction – see Searle 1979). Conventional function-structure relationships result in the coincidence or insignificant divergences between locution and illocution not affecting the transformation of the illocutionary type of the act. Thus, in (6) complication of illocution has not affected either the illocutionary point (an utterance still describes how things are) or other parameters of assertive acts.

(6) *I managed to get this job.*

Locution: I managed to get this job.

Illocution 1 (basic): I got this job.

Illocution-expander 2 (additionally lexicalized): I got this job after having made an effort to get it.

Assessment illocution (3): the speaker's assessment against his personal qualities (committed to success, self-motivated).

The verb *manage* in (6) has a particular inference pattern due to *its presupposed* lexical meaning "to succeed in accomplishing, achieving, or producing, especially with difficulty" (American Heritage Dictionary 2011). Therefore, presupposition of efforts or multiplicity of attempts from the speaker's side provides additional meaning, which has not influenced the nature of act preserving assertive illocution. It is possible to speak then of a direct speech act with compound illocution. A characteristic feature of such direct acts is that their additional illocution-expander component is context-free and relies on particular lexicalized meanings.

If examined from the perspective of Grice's concept of conventional implicatures, the example (6) "argues" for correlations between CI and illocution-expander in regard to their meanings and triggers.

In his explanation of *implied meaning*, Grice distinguishes between conventional and conversational implicatures (Grice 1975; see also Bach 1994; 1999; 2006; Carston 2004; 2008; Levinson 2000). *Conventional implicatures* convey the same additional

"lexicalized" meaning regardless of the context while *conversational implicatures* are calculated afresh each time the speaker and the hearer interact with considering the cooperative principle, shared conventional code, background knowledge and the linguistic context of usage (Grice 1975: 50).

(7) *Even Sam came to a masterclass.*

The utterance (7) conveys two additional meanings indexed by *even*, i.e., (a) Sam usually does not attend a masterclass and (b) many people attended the masterclass that time. Commenting on the similar inference of conventional implicatures, Karttunen and Peters (1979: 12) stated, "they simply arise from the presence of the word *even*".

If viewed as a speech act, (7) displays that its additional illocution (a) matches the conventional implicature and (b) leaves unchanged the assertive point although charged with some additional implicated meaning.

Similarly, illocution-expander in other direct assertives matches the conventional implicature if both of them rely on the common markers (with semi-predicative function) of implicated part of their meaning. Triggers of the additional meanings include *only, too, even, also, already, yet, just, in spite of, either, before, after, notwithstanding, regardless of, still* (Abbott 2000; Beaver & Condoravdi 2003; von Fintel 2004; Karttunen 1974; Simons 2001). Some scientists suggest the same function of the implicative verbs (with infinitival complements) (Beaver 1997) like *to manage to, to forget to, to happen to, or to force to*, etc. capable to evoke some presuppositions as in (8-10).

(8) I happen to know him.

Locution: I know him.

Illocution 1 (basic): I know him by chance.

Illocution-expander 2 (additional lexicalized) = Conventional Implicature: It is a surprise for me that I know him.

(9) *I was forced to accept his proposition.*

Locution: I accepted his proposition.

Illocution 1 (basic): I was not going to accept his proposition.

Illocution-expander 2 (additional lexicalized) = Conventional Implicature: My decision was not voluntary.

Assessment illocution (3) *intended by the speaker in order to project the perlocutionary assessment*: the speaker's assessment against his motives (I have nothing to do with it. I am not guilty).

Assessment perlocutionary effect: intended – the speaker's positive assessment against his motives or unintended (unforeseen) – the speaker's negative assessment as weak-willed or trying to shift the responsibility onto other people or circumstances.

Among markers of Conventional Implicature and, correspondingly, of illocution-expander component a special place belongs to expressive modifiers described by Cruse (1986: 272) (see also Potts 2005) or intensifiers, "which 'strengthen' content words" and often have an emotional connotations (247).

(10) *I strongly ask you not to smoke here.*

Locution: Do not smoke here.

Illocution 1 (basic): I really intend to get the hearer stop smoking.

Illocution-expander 2 (additional lexicalized) = Conventional Implicature: I am in an intense emotional state.

As we can see from (10), expressive modifiers / intensifiers perform a triple function – they are not only the triggers of conventional implicature and illocution-expanders but also the markers of the degree of strength with which the directive illocutionary point is presented.

4.3 Direct acts' additional illocution and conventional implicatures: relations of mediation by felicity conditions

Correspondence of additional direct acts' illocution to conventional implicatures applies only to assertives. In other types of speech acts, CI does not coincide with the illocution but influences the latter through the reference to the felicity conditions of the speech act.

4.3.1 Felicity conditions of Speech acts

In order to be valid and appropriate speech acts must satisfy particular *Felicity conditions* classified into five groups, i.e., general, content, preparatory, sincerity, and essential conditions (Yule 1996: 50).

General condition presupposes the participants' knowledge of the code ("shared" language).

Preparatory conditions include:

- Ability conditions: (a) whether the authority of the speaker (his social status and roles) and circumstances of speech are appropriate to the successful performance of the act, (b) whether the hearer is able to perform an action intended by the Speaker. The comissive *I swear you'll be blessed* (Elton John) cannot achieve its goal because the speaker is unable to fulfill such an oath.

- Benefit condition: whether the speaker performs his act in the hearer's interest. The commissive *I vow to be your friend to the end of my days* will not be valid unless the hearer is interested in having the speaker among his friend till the rest of their lives.

- The first two preparatory conditions are particularly important for commissives and some directives (advise, warnings, suggestions, offers, invitations).

- Non-expectancy condition: it is not obvious that the hearer will do actions referred to by the speaker if not being told to do them. Perlocutionary act of the hearer is his / her one-time response to the speaker's illocutionary message. For example, the act of agreement corresponds to a particular act of request.

Propositional content condition: the Speaker's illocution should be consistent with the propositional content of his acts. Directives propositionally refer to the hearer's future acts; commissives represent future actions of the Speaker. Propositional content of most expressives may refer to any event or qualities though a particular type of expressives (i.g., greetings) is devoid of the propositional content. To achieve an assertive illocution the Speaker must be sure of the truth of the propositional content that may represent actions in arbitrary time.

Sincerity condition: this is the speaker's psychological state necessary for accomplishment of a speech act, which must be performed seriously and sincerely. Sincerity conditions differ in their degree since the same psychological state may assume various degrees of intensity, e.g., imploring expresses a stronger desire than requesting.

*Essential condition*s: According to Yule (1996: 51), it is a combination of what should be in the utterance content, the nature of contexts and the speakers' intentions to do their actions (see also Searle 1980: 323).

4.3.1.1 Markers of felicity conditions vs. degree of strength of illocution.
Somewhat paradoxically, the accumulation of markers of felicity conditions weakens the degree of strength of the illocutionary force presupposed by these conditions as in (11).
(11) *I advise you to be properly prepared for the exam to get good grades.*
In (11) illocutionary force is indexed by simultaneous referring to four Felicity conditions, i.e.:
(a)   the Hearer's ability conditions (to be properly prepared),
(b)   the Hearer's benefit condition (to get good grades),
(c)   non-expectancy condition: the exam as a particular event demanding a one-time fulfillment of the speaker's commitment to put good marks or a one-time hearer's response (to prepare well) to the speaker's message.

(d)   propositional content condition provided by the infinitive of purpose referring to future action pertinent to propositional content of both commissives and directives.

Accumulation of markers of ability conditions diminishes the directive illocutionary force of the speech act through "distancing" the speaker from the content of his message by shifting the responsibility to the hearer (the benefit condition of advice becomes "subordinate" to the ability conditions).

4.3.2 Conventional implicatures and felicity conditions of speech acts

As distinct from assertives, the additional illocution of directives and commissives does not correspond to conventional implicature directly but through the latter's propositional contribution to the felicity conditions appropriate to the successful speech act performance. As shown by the analyzed data such type of additional IDSA relies on adverbial modifiers and other means, which refer to felicity conditions of the particular speech act (e.g., in terms of the speaker / hearer's ability to perform some action, etc.) as in (12-13).

(12) *I promise to help you this time.*

a. *Basic Illocution*: I promise to help you this time.

b. *Compound Conventional Implicature* (based on temporal deixis *this time*):

(b.1) until this time I have not been able to help you.

(b.2) this time I am able to fulfill my promise (<u>refers to Ability Condition as a key Felicity Condition for commissives</u>).

(c.1) *Additional Illocutionary Component:* I am sure that I will help you (<u>bases on Conventional Implicature (b.2) indexing the circumstances appropriate to the commissive successful performance</u>).

(c.2) *Additional illocution projecting perlocutionary assessment*: Speaker's awareness in performing his act in hearer's interests.

Assessment Perlocution: Positive assessment of the speaker against his / her actions (based on the fact that the speaker satisfies the hearer's benefit felicity conditions).

Perlocution corresponding to assessment illocution: Positive attitude towards the speaker, confidence in him and his actions.

Perlocution unintended by the speaker: the speaker's negative assessment against his actions – "he may go back on promises again" or "he won't help any more, except *this time*".

(13) *At least today, do not talk nonsense.*

a. *Basic Illocution*: Do not talk nonsense today.

b. *Compound Conventional Implicature* (bases on adverbial modifier *at least*):

(b.1) he / she says nonsense not for the first time.

(b.2) this day is somehow different from the other days (refers to the non-expectancy condition, constituting, in its turn, the directive preparatory condition).

c. *Additional illocutionary Component*: You should refrain from idle talk, given the uniqueness of the day (bases on Conventional Implicature (b.2) indexing an importance of the Hearer's one-time response as a preparatory non-expectancy condition strengthening the act's directivity).

Thus, the type of correlation between the additional illocution and conventional implicature is different for direct acts of assertive, on the one hand, and for direct commissives and directives – on the other hand. In assertives, an illocution-expander coincides with conventional implicature elaborating the basic illocutionary information with additional meanings. In commissives and directives, additional illocution does not match the conventional implicature but bases on it since CI implicitly refers to one of such acts' felicity conditions. In such a case, additional illocution does not expand or complicate the basic illocutionary force but acts as its intensifier (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Specifics of the correlations between conventional implicature and additional illocution of different direct speech acts

5. Illocution of direct acts, conventional implicature and semantic presupposition

As shown in 4.2, triggers of conventional implicature and expanding illocution have particular inference patterns due to their *presupposed* lexical meaning, i.e. the conventional additional meaning of particular lexical units. According to Potts (2013: 3), semantic (*conventional*, *lexical*) presuppositions make up a part of the encoded meanings of specific words and constructions, called presupposition *triggers* (Beaver 2001; Chierchia 1995; Heim & Kratzer 1998).

5.1 To illocution-expander via conventional implicatures and presuppositions in lexical meanings: relation of correspondence

This type of relationship becomes obvious by comparison of two types of previously identified matches: (a) correspondence of illocution-expander to conventional implicatures based on the common markers of their implicated meaning; (b)

correspondence of conventional implicature to semantic presupposition (Karttunen & Peters 1979; Roberts et al. 2009).

(14) *You are not ready for the lesson again.*
Locution: You are not ready for the lesson again.
Illocution 1: Negative assessment of the hearer against his / her actions or lack of an action (I am displeased with your behavior).
Illocution-Expander = Semantic Presupposition = Conventional implicature: He / she is repeatedly not ready for the lesson.

In (14) the presupposition as well as conventional implicature rely on adverb *again* presupposing the repeated lack of preparation. Additional illocutionary focus of the act also aims to stress the repeated lack of readiness, and therefore it matches both the semantic presupposition and conventional implicature.
However (14) does not exclude the directive illocution either ("be ready next time"). In the case of the indirect speech act, its illocution does not coincide with SP and CI but is based on them.

The relation of correspondence between conventional implicature and illocution-expander may occur not only *via* presuppositions in lexical meanings but also owing to the intended violation of categorical presuppositions.

Categorical presuppositions relate to the notion of semantic compatibility when an actant is expected to be within the scope of the predicate's applicability (Падучева 1977). Thus, the predicate *"know"* presupposes the animate actant and "the tree knows" would then violate the categorical presuppositions.

Violations often rely on stylistic devices in terms of sustained metaphors. Such devices act then as the particular illocutionary indexes similar to some conventional implicature triggers (e.g., expressive modifiers, etc.), which carry the conventional additional

connotative meanings. As Ruiz de Mendoza states, "You are a chicken! does not simply mean 'You are a coward', but adds a number of extra meaning implications about the addressee's weakness, lack of self-confidence, and inability to rise up to challenging situations. It is this complex conceptual package, rather than just the idea of 'cowardice', that is brought into meaning composition" (Ruiz de Mendoza 2013: 242).

(15) *He is boiling with anger.*

The utterance (15), which is based on a sustained conceptual metaphor "Passion is fluid" violates the categorical presupposition about the semantic compatibility of the verb *boil* with the words denoting liquids capable to undergo the action of boiling.

Illocution 1(Basic): He is angry.

Illocution-Expander = Semantic Presupposition = Conventional implicature: His agitation reached the maximum point. It is difficult for him to control his anger.

The next type of relations between semantic presuppositions and additional illocutions of direct acts is mediated by Felicity Conditions.

5.2.1 From factitive and existential presuppositions to illocution via felicity conditions: relation of mediation

This type of relation primarily concerns the *factitive* presuppositions and direct assertives illocution. *Factitive* presuppositions are based on the factitive verbs: *know, be aware, regret, realize, discover, remember, notice,* etc., which imply that their object (the complement) is true (Heim 1992; Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970; Karttunen & Peters 1979). Such presupposition meaning constitutes the essential felicity condition for direct assertives.

Let us use the following statements as examples:

(16) *I know many Americans are concerned about these threats* (terrorism) (Obama 2014).

Illocution 1(Basic): Many Americans are concerned about these threats.

Presupposition: Americans are actually concerned (factitive verb *know* presupposes that the proposition of the complement is true and draws the audience's attention to the speaker's awareness of it).

Additional Illocution 2: the speaker has the knowledge sufficient to commit himself to the truth of the expressed state of affairs.

Assessment Illocution 3: Confidence in the speaker.

Therefore, the factitive presuppositions contribute to the maximum degree of assertive illocution thus implementing the Essential Condition for assertives: to commit to the truth of the uttered proposition. However, such type of additional illocutionary meaning does not extend the propositional part of the basic illocution functioning only as an illocution-intensifier.

It is worth mentioning that factitive presuppositions may contribute to the ability conditions of both direct and indirect speech acts. For example, in (*I know I can do it for you*) or in (*I know you can do it*) the factitive presuppositions implied by the verb *know* refer to the speaker's ability conditions for indirect commissives and the hearer's ability conditions for indirect directives respectively. However, we will not dwell on the correlations between indirect speech acts and factitive presuppositions because it is not the focus of our research.

Presuppositions of existence and uniqueness as a part of the truth conditions of the sentences influence direct acts' illocution by referring to essential felicity condition of assertives and to felicity conditions of other direct speech acts.

(17) *We promise to increase our support to forces fighting the terrorists* (Obama 2014).

Illocution 1 (basic) of a commissive: the speaker's commitment to increase the support of antiterrorist forces.

Illocution-intensifier (based on presuppositions referring to both the speaker's ability conditions and the hearer's benefit condition satisfactory to the act of a commissive): We promise to defeat terrorists by joint efforts.

Presuppositions: there are three presuppositions of existence necessary for the above utterance to have its reference and to fulfill certain felicity conditions for commissives. All of them are indexed by the corresponding definite descriptions:

1.   Some support has been provided (the presuppositions about the existence of the support rely on the possessive pronoun *our* and, partially, on the verb *"increase"* implying the availability of the referent (a certain amount of support) subjected to the act of increasing).

2.   There are some forces fighting the terrorists (definiteness in the descriptions of such forces implying the presuppositions about their existence are based on the specifying participial phrase).

3.   There are certain terrorists (the presuppositions about the existence and uniqueness of its referent are marked by the definite article).

Presuppositions of existence contribute to the commissives' illocutionary force by referring to:

(a)   <u>Ability conditions</u>: presuppositions (1) and (2) about the forces fighting the terrorists and availability of support to such forces <u>contribute to the circumstances appropriate to the speaker' commitment being performed successfully</u>.

(b)   <u>Benefit condition for the hearer</u>: presupposition (3) about the terrorists' existence associates with the topos of "threat" demanding threat eliminating actions <u>as performed in the hearer's interest</u> and motivating the propositional content of the commissive.

To sum up the types of additional illocution of direct speech acts depend both on the illocutionary point of the act (assertive, commissive or directive) and on the correlative implicit meanings induced by presuppositions and conventional implicatures as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Additional illocutions of direct speech acts via correlative implicit meanings

The type of direct speech acts	The type of additional illocution	Triggers of additional illocution	Correlative implicit meanings	Type of correlation between additional illocution and other implicit meanings
Assertive	lexicalized additional illocution / basic illocution-expander	implicative verbs (with infinitival complements); words and constructions with encoded presupposed meanings; expressive modifiers, etc.	conventional implicature = semantic presupposition in lexical meaning	correspondence
Assertives	lexicalized additional illocution / basic illocution-expander	sustained metaphors and other devices based on violation of the "actant – predicate" semantic compatibility	violation of categorical presuppositions = conventional implicature	correspondence
Commissives Directives	basic illocution-intensifier	adverbial modifiers and other means to specify the conditions of the speech act (e.g., in terms of the Speaker / Hearer's ability to perform some action, etc.).	conventional implicature	mediation by Felicity Conditions of speech act (CI propositionally contributes to a particular act's Felicity Conditions)
Direct assertives	basic illocution-intensifier	factitive verbs and expressions: *know, be aware, regret, realize, discover*	factitive presuppositions	contribution to the particular Felicity Conditions of speech act
Various speech acts	basic illocution-intensifier	definite descriptions	presuppositions of existence and uniqueness	contribution to the particular Felicity Conditions of speech act.

6. Conclusions

The paper identifies the structure of illocution of direct speech acts in its correlations with conventional implicatures and semantic presuppositions. We introduced the new notions of the compound illocution of direct acts, assessment illocution, and additional illocution. The latter may be manifested by illocution-expander and illocution-intensifier.

Both additional illocution and assessment illocution extend the IDSA's information structure without transforming the illocutionary point of the particular speech act. The illocution-expander has the particular structural lexicalized markers with conventional

inference patterns suggesting its similarity to conventional implicatures and semantic presuppositions. In that, this DSAI's constituent contrasts with primary illocutionary force of the indirect speech, which is context-sensitive and devoid of the formal indexes of the utterance meaning.

The relation of correspondence between conventional implicatures and illocution-expanders depends not only on lexical type of semantic presuppositions but also on the violation of categorical presuppositions aimed at extension of IDSA's connotative meaning. At that, the violation of categorical presuppositions operates as the conventional implicature trigger akin to expressive modifiers, which carry the conventional additional connotative information.

The correspondence illocutions of direct acts to conventional implicatures applies only to direct assertives. In other types of speech acts, conventional implicature does not match the additional illocution and only intensifies the illocutionary force *via* content contribution to the felicity conditions of the speech acts. Similar correlations are identified between the additional illocution and the factitive and existential presuppositions that contribute to the reinforcement of basic illocution by referring to essential, ability, and benefit felicity conditions. Such type of additional illocution is specified as an illocution-intensifier.

The assessment illocution as a part of compound IDSA consists in the speaker's intention to be assessed against his motives, sincerity, personal qualities and capabilities roughly corresponding to Felicity conditions of the particular speech act. Such dimension of IDSA is due to the interactive focus of speech acts in view of participants' orientation not only on the "shared" meaning construction but also on identification of their interpersonal relationships.

The assessment illocution guides the assessment perlocution consisting in a cognitive change in the hearer's believes or attitudes towards the speaker. Cumulative

perlocutionary effect results from the total of what is intended to communicate, including the assessment and additional (expanding or intensifying) aspects of the IDSA.

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Abbreviations:

CI – conventional implicature

DSAI – direct speech acts' illocution

SP – semantic presupposition

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Résumé in English

The paper addresses one of the key problems in the field of pragmatics – the issue of illocution in its relation to other types of implicit meanings. Though much work has been done in pragmatics in order to explore the illocutionary properties of indirect speech acts, the problem of complexity of direct speech acts' illocution (DSAI) remained unsolved. The paper aims to reveal the DSAI constituents in their correlations with conventional implicatures (CI) and semantic presuppositions. The investigation of links between implicated while structurally marked meanings contributes to the issue of the interface between context-free entailments. The author investigated three possible facets of DSAI – Illocution-Expander, Illocution-Intensifier and Assessment Illocution, describing their formal triggers and the process of their meaning inference. In doing so, the author has used the techniques of Form / Function pragmatics, Literal Force Hypothesis, inferential pragmatics, 'speech act schema' explanatory tools. The analyzed data have been collected from conversational, literary, and political discourses. The major finding is that there are two types of correlations between DSAI components, CI and semantic presuppositions: match and mediation by CI or CP's highlighting the speech acts' felicity conditions. Illocution-Expander bases on words with presupposed lexical meanings and matches CI in triggers and the context-free conventional inference patterns. Illocution-Intensifier, strengthening the illocutionary

force without expanding the act's meaning, bases on CI by virtue of the latter's emphasizing the essential, ability, and benefit felicity conditions of particular speech acts. Optional Assessment Illocution relies on stimuli, prompting Hearer's positive attitude and trust. Likewise, Illocution-Expander matches lexical presuppositions since it bases on the encoded meanings of specific words while Illocution-Intensifier is triggered by presuppositions' reference to speech acts' felicity conditions. Factitive presuppositions evoked by factitive verbs, as well as presuppositions of existence and uniqueness commit to the truth of the proposition thus contributing to the essential condition for assertives. As a whole, the study of direct speech acts' illocution as a multifaceted meaning sheds more light on the problem of interrelated pragmatic entailments, conventionally associated with speech acts' surface forms.

Key words: direct speech act, indirect speech act, compound illocution, illocution-expander, illocution-intensifier, assessment illocution, assessment perlocution, conventional implicature, semantic presupposition, felicity conditions.

Résumé in German

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit einem der Schlüsselprobleme der Pragmatik, nämlich der Frage der Illokution und ihrer Verbindung mit anderen Typen impliziter Bedeutungen in Sprechakten. Obwohl die illokutionären Indikatoren in indirekten Sprechakten aus Sicht der Pragmatik hinreichend erforscht sind, ist das Problem der komplexen Illokutionen in direkten Sprechakten (IDSA) nach wie vor kaum untersucht. Ziel des vorliegenden Aufsatzes ist es, die einzelnen Elemente von IDSA in ihrer Korrelation mit konventionellen Implikaturen (KI) und semantischen Präsuppositionen (SP) herauszuarbeiten. Die Untersuchung der Verbindungen von impliziten und dabei strukturell markierten Bedeutungen kann als Beitrag zu der Frage kontextunabhängiger Implikationen gesehen werden. Analysiert werden im einzelnen drei mögliche Typen von IDSA: ausführende, intensivierende und bewertende Illokutionen, ferner werden ihre formalen Auslöseworte (Trigger) sowie der Prozess der Inferenz untersucht. Methodisch orientiert sich die Untersuchung an der

funktionalen Pragmatik, der pragmatischen Inferenz, der Literal Force Hypothesis (LFH) und am Sprechakt-Schema (speech act schema, SAS). Das zu untersuchende Datenmaterial stellt Ausschnitte aus mündlichen, literarischen und politischen Diskursen dar. Im Ergebnis werden vor allem zwei Arten von Korrelationen zwischen Komponenten von IDSA, KI und semantischen Präsuppositionen demonstriert, und zwar in Bezug auf Angemessenheit und Mittelbarkeit sowie auf die entsprechenden Glückensbedingungen mittels KI und SP. Die ausführende Illokution basiert auf lexikalischen Präsuppositionen und entspricht KI hinsichtlich der Auslöseworte (Trigger) und der Modelle kontextunabhängiger konventioneller Inferenz. Die intensivierende Illokution, mit der eine verstärkende und nachdrückliche Wirkung erzielt werden soll, ohne dass dabei die Bedeutung des Sprechakts selbst erweitert wird, basiert auf KI, welche die Voraussetzungen für das Glücken eines bestimmten Sprechakts bilden: die Fähigkeit des Sprechers / Hörers, sich zu äußern, die Überlegenheit des Hörers sowie die grundlegenden Voraussetzungen. Die fakultative bewertende Illokution basiert schließlich auf Stimuli, welche auf eine positive Haltung des Hörers und dessen Vertrauen hindeuten. Entsprechend kann die ausführende Illokution mit lexikalischen Präsuppositionen übereinstimmen, weil sie auf den konventionellen Bedeutungen der betreffenden Wörter basiert, während die intensivierende Illokution dadurch ausgelöst wird, dass die Präsuppositionen sich an den Glückensbedingungen ausrichten. Faktive Präsuppositionen, welche in einem Zusammenhang mit faktiven Verben stehen, ebenso wie Präsuppositionen des Vorhandenseins und der Einzigartigkeit, die den Wahrheitsgehalt der Proposition belegen, bilden damit die wesentlichen Voraussetzungen für die Assertionen. Im Ganzen beleuchtet die vorliegende Untersuchung des komplexen Bedeutungsspektrums von Illokutionen in direkten Sprechakten aus pragmatischer Sicht die Wechselbeziehung solcher Bedeutungen, die aus konventioneller Sicht mit formalen Merkmalen in Verbindung gebracht werden.

Stichwörter: direkter Sprechakt, indirekter Sprechakt, zusammengesetzte Illokution, ausführende Illokution, intensivierende Illokution, bewertende Illokution,

konventionelle Inferenz, semantische Präsuppositionen, faktive Präsuppositionen, Glückensbedingungen, pragmatischen Inferenz, konventionelle Inferenz.

Résumé in French (translated by Amadu Can)

L'article est consacré à l'un des principaux problèmes dans le domaine de la pragmatique – le problème de l'illocution dans l'aspect de sa relation avec d'autres types de significations implicites. Alors que les caractéristiques illocutoires des actes de langage indirects ont reçu la consécration au sein des studios pragmatiques, le problème complexe de l'illocution des actes de langage directs (IALD) reste inexploré. Le but de l'article est d'identifier les composantes de l'IALD dans leur corrélation avec l'implicature conventionnelle (CI) et les présuppositions sémantiques (SP). L'analyse des relations entre les valeurs implicites mais marquées structurellement apporte sa contribution au problème des conséquences contextuellement indépendantes des significations implicites. Trois aspects possibles d'analyse de l'IALD: ilocution-élargisseuse, illocution-intensificatrice et illocution évaluatrice, leurs déclencheurs et leurs processus d'inférence sont explorés. Pour ce fait des méthodes de la pragmatique fonctionnelle / formelle, la pragmatique déductive, l'hypothèse du sens littéral de la force illocutoire, le système du schéma d'acte de parole ont été utilisé. Les données des fragments sélectionnés sont tirés des discours familiers, artistiques et politiques. Les résultats principaux consistent en l'identification de deux types de corrélations entre les composantes de l'IALD, l'implicature conventionnelle et les présupposés sémantiques: les relations de conformité et de médiation par le biais des conditions de réussite des actes de paroles de l'implicature conventionnelle et des présuppositions sémantiques. L'ilocution-élargisseuse est conditionnée par des valeurs présuppositionnelles en raison de certains mots et correspond à l'implicature conventionnelle par rapport aux déclencheurs et aux modèles de l'inférence conventionnelle contextuellemen indépendante, l'illocution-intensificatrice qui intensifie la force de l'illocution, n'élargissant pas l'importance de l'acte, est basée sur l'implicature conventionnelle qui distingue une des conditions de la réussite de l'acte de parole: la condition liée à la possibilité de réaliser l'acte par les locuteurs/auditeurs, la condition de l'avantage de

l'acte pour le locuteur ou bien une condition importante. L'illocution évaluative facultative est basée sur des motivations, qui provoquent une relation positive ainsi que la confiance de l'Auditeur envers le Locuteur. De manière analogue, l'illocution élargisseuse peut correspondre aux présuppositions lexicales car elle est basée sur des significations conventionnelles de jetons déterminés, alors que l'illocution intensificatrice s'actualise lorsque les présuppositions s'adressent aux conditions de réussite des actes de parole. Les présuppositions factitives liées aux verbes factitifs, ainsi que les présuppositions d'existence et d'unicité déterminent la véracité de la proposition et donc renforcent l'illocution assertive (en affirmant, le locuteur prend la responsabilité d'être fiable). Dans l'ensemble, l'étude de l'illocution des actes de paroles comme valeur complexe nous éclaire sur le problème des relations des significations pragmatiques, conventionnellement liées aux propriétés formelles des actes de paroles.

Mots-clés: acte du discours direct, acte du discours indirect, l'illocution complexe, l'illocution élargisseuse; l'illocution intensificatrice, l'illocution évaluatrice, la perlocution évaluatrice, l'implicature conventionnelle, la présupposition sémantique, la condition de réussite.

Résumé in Russian

Статья посвящена одной из ключевых проблем в области прагматики – вопросу иллокуции и её связи с другими типами имплицитных смыслов. Несмотря на то, что иллокутивные характеристики непрямых речевых актов получили должное освящение в прагматических исследованиях, проблема сложной иллокуции прямых речевых актов (ИПРА) остаётся неисследованной. Цель статьи – выявить составляющие ИПРА в их корреляции с конвенциональными импликатурами (КИ) и семантическими пресуппозициями (СП). Исследование связей между имплицитными, но структурно маркированными значениями вносит определённый вклад в проблему контекстуально независимых импликаций. Анализируются три возможных аспекта ИПРА: Иллокуция-Расширитель, Иллокуция-Интенсификатор и Оценочная Иллокуция, исследуются их

формальные триггеры и процесс инференции. Для этого применяются методики Формально-Функциональной прагматики, инференциальной прагматики, Гипотеза формальных индексов иллокутивной силы (Literal Force Hypothesis), речеактная схема ('speech act schema'). Анализируемые данные выбраны из фрагментов разговорного, художественного и политического дискурсов. Основные результаты заключаются в выявлении двух типов корреляций между составляющими ИПРА, КИ и семантическими пресуппозициями: отношений соответствия и опосредованности – привлечения посредством КИ и СП условий успешности речевых актов. Иллокуция-Расширитель основывается на лексических пресуппозициях и соответствует КИ в отношении триггеров и моделей контекстуально независимой конвенциональной инференции. Иллокуция-Интенсификатор, усиливающая иллокутивную силу, не расширяя значения акта, основывается на КИ, выделяющей условия успешности определенного речевого акта: условие способности осуществления акта говорящим / слушающим, условие преимущества для слушающего и существенное условие. Факультативная Оценочная Иллокуция основывается на стимулах, определяющих позитивное отношение и доверие Слушающего. Аналогичным образом, Иллокуция-Расширитель может совпадать с лексическими пресуппозициями, поскольку основывается на конвенциональных значениях определенных слов, в то время как Иллокуция-Интенсификатор актуализируется посредством обращения пресуппозиций к условиям успешности речевых актов. Фактитивные пресуппозиции, связанные с фактитивными глаголами, а также пресуппозиции существования и единственности, определяющие истинность пропозиции, усиливают существенное условие для ассертивов. В целом, изучение иллокуции прямых речевых актов как комплексного значения проливает свет на проблему взаимосвязи прагматических значений, конвенционально связанных с формальными свойствами речевых актов.

Ключевые слова: прямой речевой акт, непрямой речевой акт, сложная иллокуция, иллокуция-засширитель, иллокуция-интенсификатор, оценочная иллокуция, конвенциональная импликатура, семантическая пресуппозиция, условия успешности.