CONCEPTUALIZING THE MENTAL SPHERE IN DISCOURSE: FROM ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY TO MARK TWAIN[1]

Anastasia Sharapkova, Evgeny Loginov, Larissa Manerko*,

Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

*Corresponding author

Abstract: The systemized attempts to elaborate on the human mind were made in the works of the Enlightenment project. John Locke and David Hume influenced greatly the American Enlightenment as well as the American public discourse. Through embracing the major constructs of European tradition by Thomas Paine and other writers, the influence extended to Mark Twain. We introduce the key notions connected with *mind* through linguistic, cognitive and discourse analysis.

Key words: linguistic analysis, conceptual metaphors, image schemas, Enlightenment philosophy, discourse of Mark Twain, mind, consciousness, reason.

> *Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific understanding of the universe.*
> (David Chalmers "The conscious mind")

1. Introduction

How to understand the way the human brain works and consciousness evolves, what constitutes an individual mind and forms knowledge – these are the perplexing questions that have been challenging the humanity for centuries. Every new period in evolution of ideas brought into limelight certain thoughts and conceptions about the

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essence of mental entities, organizing language means and their meanings with the reference to a particular language personality and socio-cultural context.

In this respect, the most decisive attempts to penetrate into the human mind were made in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The thinkers of that period not only proposed the first comprehensive system of consciousness, but also transformed the meaning of the words of everyday language to match the transformations in understanding the human mind. Their philosophical ideas gradually paved the way from a scientifically oriented discourse to a common image of the world. They spread to non-scientific journals, fiction, reaching the hearts and souls of the reading public. Finally, they were 'distilled' in the mode of day-to-day thinking. We **aim** to scrutinize these putative stages and linguistic consequences of 'evolution of ideas' in our article.

In the present paper we address philosophical discourse of the Enlightenment and its linguistic and cognitive legacy with special attention to social and cultural aspects of language, which "can be heralded as a re-turn" in cognitive linguistic studies (Langacker 1994: 3). The Enlightenment conception of mind is justly acknowledged to have "shaped first generation cognitive science" (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 308), the first writings in psychology (Васильев 2010; Bazerman 1987: 131), and to a certain extent – the origin of modern cognitive linguistics (Chomsky 2009). In the paper, we scrutinize the treatises of the most prominent figures of the British and American Enlightenment who influenced greatly the fiction works of the succeeding decades. In particular, we analyze the works of John Locke (1632 – 1704) and David Hume (1711 – 1765). As their construal of the world punctuated the American philosophy, we also included into our analysis the philosophical legacy of Thomas Paine (1737 – 1809), the outstanding American essay writer. Here we harness an integrative **approach,** embracing linguistic, cognitive, and discourse analysis to reveal how the most essential cognitive entities and mechanisms describing the human mental sphere originated in the philosophy of the British and American Enlightenment, then further developed and

spread into those types of discourse far remote from the philosophy pure and simple – such as the fiction of Mark Twain (1835 – 1910). He most naturally embraced the philosophical issues in his writings.

2. The thread of thought: From Enlightenment philosophy to public rhetoric

The turn to the most profound scholarly interest addressing human intelligence can be traced to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, whose success made it "an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles" (Bristow 2017). Alexander Pope summarized the mood of the epoch in "An essay on man: Epistle II" by the following words "A proper study of mankind is man" (Pope), indicating the necessity to understand a human being and the pathways of achieving knowledge before turning to nature.

John Locke was the first figure of the Enlightenment and one of the most influential scholars in the Western history, who claimed that a person is neither a soul nor a body, but *a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it Self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and ...essential to it* (Locke 2008: 208). He noticed that a person *belongs only to intelligent agents capable of law, and happiness and misery* (ibid., 218). This definition had a huge impact even on contemporary analytic metaphysics (Ayers 1993; Mackie 1976; Perry 1976: 67; Strawson 2011), especially on the psychological approach to personal identity popular among professional philosophers nowadays (Bourget & Chalmers 2014).

David Hume was also a key figure of Western philosophy belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment. He devised several brilliant theories based on extraordinary elegant arguments: the so-called regularity theory of causation, psychological associationism in philosophy of mind and personal identity. Hume was also a great writer, well known

for his bright style, thus creating several metaphors influential in the Western philosophy.

In America, the ideas of the Enlightenment proceeded throughout the 18th century (Arneil 1996; Flower & Murphey 1977; Kuklick 2001) and had a huge indelible impact on the intellectual audience sometimes morphing into a viable political force. The Enlightenment ideas yielded certain images and cognitive constructs becoming universally acknowledged vision of the world nearly akin to self- and national identity. The intellectual world of the 18th century became "the time of assimilating these ideas" introducing the thoughts of "the founders of the new European metaphysics to a broad reading public" (Васильев 2010: 7).

The Enlightenment helped unite Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson as the key contributors to the new state. Locke's political claims underlined the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. They became a tool for a secularization of intellectual life, because Locke's theory was "fundamentally incompatible with the Platonic doctrine of American Puritans" (Flower & Murphey 1977: 68), which dominated in the New World during the 17th century. Locke's philosophy was at the heart of American education and science (Brent 1998: 28). Hume's contribution to American philosophy and ideology was not equal to Locke's, yet his thoughts and life were deeply connected with America. Hume met Franklin during his visits to Scotland in 1759 and 1771 and became his pen-friend (Atiyah 2006). Though Hume died in the year when the Declaration of Independence was adopted, he was one among a few writers on the British Islands claiming that the colonies should be independent.

If we bear in mind the need to formulate the foundations for a new state and order in America, this intellectual pathos was linked with the religious toleration most naturally mingled with a social one closely tied with moulding the ideas into an institutionalized

form. Paine, having received his education in England, became the leader of this pathos and the single most influential political writer in America. He embodied the very spirit of Enlightenment movement and absorbed the ideas of British and French writers of his time (Ryder 2004: 31). Three of his main works became bestsellers to ultimately morph into cultural memes. The "Common sense" was a source of inspiration for the U.S. Declaration of Independence, "Rights of man" – the universal declaration of human rights, "The age of reason" became a name for the age of Enlightenment itself (Hampshire 1956).

Paine was not a profound philosopher himself, but "… he had a power of expression that has exceeded that of almost any political thinker in the English language" (Kuklick 2000: xi). He was strongly influenced by Locke. Moreover, some political thoughts expressed in "Common sense" indicate a close reading of Hume, though he was even criticized that his "Rights of man" was not like Hume's "Idea of a perfect commonwealth" (Paine 1945b: 447). Paine's explanation of the origin of government and various ways of maintaining monarchies is identical to Hume's standpoints as expressed in the essays "Of the original contract" and "Of the origin of government" (Werner 1972: 450).

Thus, the importance of Locke's and Hume's ideas for the American revolution cannot be underestimated. After the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788, Benjamin Rush proclaimed that it was the "triumph of knowledge over ignorance, of virtue over vice, and of liberty over slavery" (1951: 471). As it is noted by Wood, "with the break from Great Britain complete and the Constitution ratified, many Americans in the 1790s thought that the United States had become the "most enlightened" nation in the world" (2006: 159). Moreover, a number of works highlighted that even "in the early decades of the 19th century America was heir to an Enlightenment notion of human nature" (Quirk 2015: 22). The Enlightenment spirit became flesh and blood of American culture with a passionate belief in scientific progress and human reasoning.

The philosophical ideas spread to American newspapers, magazines, and fiction, such as the novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" by Twain, published in 1889. It is a vivid example of artistic and philosophical worldviews combined, satire accompanied by profound reflections on human nature dating back to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The book clashes the mythological view of an outdated Britain embodied by King Arthur as a typical image and a Yankee armed with the latest conceptions of *progress* as well as *mind*, *reason*, *knowledge*, and *consciousness*, and he is eager to transform the world employing them. This novel among others is "half and half admixture of fun and seriousness" (Paine 1912: 1100) viewed as a fictional verbalization of several philosophical concepts and a profound speculation on all their pros and cons as well as their limits.

Critics have justly noted that the "distinctive features of his [Twain's] thought come from Paine, or, possibly, from Hobbes, *Locke*, *Hume* and Mandeville" (Waggoner 1937: 358). Brashear tentatively remarks that "Mark Twain's thought was not much touched by 19th century speculative philosophy. It remained within the limits of the narrower experiences of the preceding age" including Locke and Hume (2017: 250). Besides that, Twain was influenced by some American political writers and thinkers. There is evidence that he got acquainted with Paine's book "The age of reason" early enough. Twain wrote in his diary in 1908, "I read it first when I was a cub pilot, read it with fear and hesitation, but marvelling at his fearlessness and power" (Britton 2011: 563). This book cultivated in Clemens a fundamentally secular outlook and criticism over church and mythological mysticism. The others mention the impact of a representative of freethinkers – Ingersoll (Lewisohn 1932), who became his friend (Schwartz 1976) and thus influenced his views on religion, belief in science and progress being clearly visible in Twain's writings.

Therefore, the thread of influence runs as follows: Locke and Hume → Paine → Twain, which moves from special discourse to public political rhetoric and fiction. This thread

seems to be most probable and is taken as a working hypothesis in the present paper, leaving the minor influences from other sources beyond. Tracing the exact links of Mark Twain with philosophical works may be rather challenging as we may not have any references left either in the form of notes in his "Notebook" or letters. So, it is impossible to obtain the exact direct evidence of him reading a particular book or being acquainted with a particular way of reasoning. Waggoner pinpoints that "he was neither a systematic student of science, nor a persistent and profound thinker; and he had nothing of the scholar's love of documentation and reference" (1937: 361).

Thus, in our research we turn to the methodology of cognitive linguistics, which is able to reveal mutual influences on a deeper analytical level – the cognitive one. This is the level, where not particularly the semantic, but the conceptual structure of the language personality is outlined. Moreover, Twain's works here serve not as a peculiar example for a detective-like story of the succession of influences on a particular human, but the experience of both a thinker and writer amounts to the experience of a generation. Artists and scientists are usually believed to be addressing the ever-perplexing questions concurrently, but from different perspectives. As Lehrer marks, "As scientists were beginning to separate thoughts into their anatomical parts, …artists wanted to understand consciousness from the inside" (2007: 13).

3. The methodology of linguistic and conceptual analysis in the study of socio-cultural specificity of discourse

It is beyond scholarly doubt nowadays that we think and talk from within the established intellectual tradition, accepted discourse, and the cultural paradigm fundamentally grounded in sensory and physical experience common to all human beings. The successive chain of processing the information in cognition leads human consciousness from observation of **reality** to **sensations**, then to the **perception** becoming "representations of a perceptual conglomeration of visual, auditory, haptic, motoric, olfactory and gustatory experience" (Oakley 2007: 216). The "objectification

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of thought" (Выготский 2014) turns to be consisting of simpler perceptual images or "conceptual representations" (Manerko 2016: 145) reflecting the properties of separate objects in space.

Linguistic forms representing cognitive mechanisms in human consciousness are used and created in their interaction (Loginov 2016). Cognitive mechanisms are better revealed on the derivational level of nomination in the process of conceptualizing new experience, when the primitive images get transformed and/or united to form more complex structures (Кубрякова 2004: 406), e.g., from *reason* to *reasoning*, *reasonable*, *unreasonable*; from *to know* to *knowledge*, *knowledgeable*; from *to understand* to *understanding*. Cognitive mechanisms directing human thought depend on categorization and conceptualization and represent the knot, tying the semiotic, semantic, onomasiological, and syntactical characteristics.

The dynamic character of communication involves also the use of units undergoing semantic changes, in which the direct and transferred meanings of a word reflect embodied cognition (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Our bodily experience serves an anchor for abstract thought "emergent from patterns of interaction or derived from perceptual experience" (Clausner 2005: 100-101) and further proceeds on to high-level cognitive operations. The basis of this conception in understanding human thought is **image schemas.** They form the methodological core of contemporary cognitive linguistics unveiling complex problems of conceptualization being the "dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs" (Johnson 1987: xiv-xvi). They include but are not limited to the following set: BALANCE, BLOCKAGE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY, COLLECTION, CONTACT, CONTAINER, COUNTERFORCE, CYCLE, FULL-EMPTY, ITERATION, LINK, MATCHING, MERGING, NEAR-FAR, OBJECT, PART-WHOLE, PATH, PROGRESS, SCALE, SPLITTING, SUPERIMPOSITION, SURFACE (Johnson 1987: 26). Image schemas are based on the power of abstract reasoning implying the ability to form symbolic structures (Lakoff 1987). They preserve the conceptual core and allow for linguistic

modifications, numerous transformations "as *recurring cognitive structures* which establish patterns of understanding and reasoning, often elaborated by extension from knowledge of our bodies as well as our experience of social interactions" (Sharifian 2017: 36).

Therefore, the image schemas once contextualized are combined and clustered in a way peculiar to a particular cultural and historical setting verbalized with a recurrent linguistic plane of expression. Still, the understanding of the world in human brains represents certain cognitive constructs dominating every particular epoch. They may become the object of comparison, being transformed slowly until they are influenced by paradigmatic shifts in Kuhn's understanding. These transformations influence human communication at all levels in a definite cultural-historical period. These complex mental representations of the social and cultural perspective are on the crust of the wave of linguistic endeavour (Комова 2005; 2013). They are studied in cognitive linguistics, where it is stressed that "while meaning is identified as conceptualisation, cognition at all levels is both embodied and *culturally embedded*" (Langacker 2014: 33).

Image schemas may manifest themselves through conceptual metaphors as the source and target domains, because they are based on the most basic images and the supraschematic structure (Grady 2005: 47). These images scaffold linguistic expression as Turner marked, "We can invent new metaphors by figuring out the image-schematic structure of the target and finding a source that matches it" (1991: 174). This cognitive ground for the linguistic expression plane is indirectly delivered by the congenial commonality between the schemas we obtain from the linguistic analysis. In Plato and Aristotle's philosophical works, a wax plate, a memorizing form, an object, or a soul revealed the concept of MIND, while HEART was understood as the container of the soul and SOUL – the container of knowledge (Манерко 2017). Linguistic and gesture studies (Chienki & Müller 2008), the studies of infants

(Wagneret al. 1981), and multimodal representations (Forceville 2008; Kövecses 2018) – all point to the image schemas being fundamental to conceptualizing experience.

Thus, cognitive linguistics and the proposed methodology help to reveal not only what is universal about the language lying at the core of a plethora of interpretations, but also what is particular about its construal grounded in the socio-cultural interaction.

4. Conceptualizing mind during the period of the Enlightenment

Two main tendencies in the human mind description were prevailing in the Enlightenment philosophy in Europe. On the one hand, the mechanistic approach to the mind was in full accord with the worldview of the epoch when animal and human bodies were compared to machines. On the other hand, swift advances in natural sciences where the laws of nature were formulated opposing the external world as space and its properties (Sharapkova & Komova 2014) to the internal one – the human mind and thinking. Practically all major philosophers of those times excluding Leibniz claimed that there were no unconscious states of mind. The so-called "official doctrine" of the Enlightenment philosophy was that "minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject to mechanical laws. The workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is private" (Ryle 2009: 3) and is rather difficult to penetrate. These two collateral histories may be described through the mirror of "nature" or "ocular" metaphor, as Rorty put it (1979: 11-12). Trying to understand how inner mechanisms (i.e. of memory, corresponding to physical experience, ideas' formation, human emotions, and feelings) could be presented by scholars, we look at words describing human thinking. It is quite clear now that the linguistic legacy of the Enlightenment is substantial, because 60 per cent of the "cognition" family terms appeared between the 17th and 19th centuries (Chaney 2013). This spreading might have been due – among other things – to the clarity and vividness of both rhetoric as well as conceptual constructs through which the philosophical ideas of that period were explicated.

In the next part of the article, we are going to analyze the image schemas realized by the lexemes under scrutiny. We are going to start with the word *mind* as the most general one and proceed with *consciousness*, *reason*, and *understanding*. The linguistic analysis, including the etymological origins of the words, will be combined with the conceptual analysis.

4.1 The etymology of mind, *its semantics and development in the early periods of English*

The word *mind* belongs to the Anglo-Saxon vocabulary in the form of *gemynd / ӡemynd / imunde / ymunde.* It was used with a prefix *ӡe-/i-/y-* in different dialects of Old English in the meaning "memory, remembrance, state of being remembered" as the Oxford English dictionary states (OED). Since the understanding of the human being was, to a large extent, holistic and undivided, it designated all mental abilities sometimes including the soul in the semantic structure of the word. The prefix ceased to exist in the middle of the 14th century altogether with the meaning of the word, which became wider denoting "any mental faculty", e.g., in Trevisa's text of 1387 this meaning is apparent: "*He was so myӡty of **mynde*** [L. tanta memoria viguit] *þat he rehersed two þowsand names arewe by herte*" (OED). By this time, the emotional shade of the meaning was enforced in *mood*, leaving the opportunity to be at the same time enhanced in *mind* and to gravitate towards "rational/spiritual self" (Kiricsi 2010). This meaning was naturally ousted by two French loan words, *memory* and *remembrance*, having appeared in the 11th and 13th centuries correspondingly. *Mind* replaced the Anglo-Saxon *wit* or *gewit* that meant "mind, reason, intelligence".

Thus, *mind* "became the basic lexeme referring to the mental faculties" (Kiricsi 2010: 283). Since it had the widest and most prototypical meaning of all the *mind* words, allowing for the wealth of context to be used, it became endowed with the specific terminological connotations. The word *mind* will be studied further in Locke's major work.

4.1.1 The description of MIND *in Locke's "An essay concerning human understanding"*
The key paper for Locke's philosophical conception is "An essay concerning human understanding" (1689). His representation of *mind* is within the general scope of the Enlightenment reasoning yet exhibiting some notable peculiarities. These allowed to name Locke the one "who more than any other philosopher established the stereotype for the popular view on the mind in the 18th century" (Abrams 1958: 57). In his work, *mind* occupies a privileged position – 1,223 examples. Locke stresses that God is the guarantor of everything in the external world; he is *that eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things* (Locke 2008: 405). In the essay, Nature has no conscious perception and the process of getting knowledge is conscious: *the soul, during sound sleep, thinks, say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions* (ibid., 59). The external world is represented by a number of bodies – these are animals and human beings. If animals have *self-perception* and *self-enjoyment*, a person is characterized by the internal world given by God to him.

Locke clearly creates a well-organized system of descriptions of the *thinking activity* of a human being. The word *thinking* is used 156 times in the essay, including several specific notions. Locke starts his description with sensations as the first step of the thinking process. He writes: *But as I call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the **ideas** it affords being such only, as the mind gets by **reflecting on its own operations within it self*** (ibid., 55). He underlines that the term *reflection* arises on the basis of sensations, while the word *perception* is used in identifying *conscious perception*.

The word *mind* is part and parcel of thinking and underlines that men HAVE minds and they are conscious, while animals *do not have* the same features. The mind is presented as the container of ideas preexisting their language expression: *men have **in***

their minds several ideas, *such as are those expressed by the words 'whiteness',* *'hardness', 'sweetness', 'thinking', 'motion', 'man', 'elephant', 'army', 'drunkenness', and* *others* (ibid., 54). Starting to write the essay, Locke did not want to speak about words in language, but then he understood that this aspect was necessary. He stresses that *words in the primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing, but the ideas in the* *mind of him that uses them* (ibid., 257). These ideas are private and individual, though the bigger part of the word meaning arises from the common perception of the world, in which we as people live with our abilities to reason. He repeats the preposition *in* fascinating the readers of the essay with one of the most prominent metaphors – MIND is A CONTAINER. In the introductory and explanatory passage to the essay, Locke writes that *when **ideas are in** our **minds**, we consider them as **being** actually there* (ibid., 72). Notably, the famous concept of "tabula rasa" Locke is known for is represented not as a blank page, but an empty cabinet: *The senses at first let in particular ideas, and* *furnish the yet **empty cabinet**: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of* *them, they are **lodged in** the Memory, and Names got to them* (ibid., 23). Viewing mind through cabinet, being a piece of furniture – a repository with drawers – is of crucial importance as it obviously implies categorization: "Locke might well have thought that this structure was the result of innate psychological mechanisms" (Ott 2003: 71). The mind is represented as a spacious container like some *mind's presence-room* full of ideas understood as a suitable means of explaining the work of mind in general. Still, this representation does not imply all the characteristics of space: *the actions of the* ***mind** are performed. For, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension;* *so its actions seem to require no time* (ibid., 85).

The PERSON conceptual metaphor is also used very often in the essay, because mind is given the ability to act like human beings. Locke underlines that for the mind there are no borders outside in reaching any location in reality and thinking it over. Thus, the physical world, even one with diamond-hard walls, cannot stop the progress of mind. *Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to*

expatiate in, which takes its **flight farther than the Stars**, *and cannot be confined by the limits of the world;* **that extends its thoughts often**, *even* **beyond the utmost expansion of Matter,** *and makes* **excursions into** *that incomprehensible Inane* (ibid., 73).

The frequency of occurrence of MIND AS A CONTAINER in Locke's paper is relatively higher (45 %) comparing to the use of the schema MIND AS A PERSON (30 %), both represented in red colour (Fig. 1). Moreover, in many cases these interpretations blend in the most natural way, indicating operations of mind, which can *narrow, blot out, come into, void,* and *unfurnish things.*


Figure 1. A comparative representation of conceptualizing *mind* in Locke's and Hume's works

Since 90 percent of all visual information comes in our brains through eyes, the personification of mind is elaborated further and mostly combined with a CONTAINER:

The perception of the mind, being most aptly explained by words relating to sight, so we shall best understand what is meant by 'clear' and 'obscure' in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call 'clear' and 'obscure' in the objects of sight (ibid., 226); *When the **mind turns its view inwards upon itself**, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs* (ibid., 134). Personifying mind seems to be as natural as perceiving it as a container – the mind is rarely considered to be a total abstraction detached from the major owner and user – the human being: ***The mind receiving*** *the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when **it turns its view inward** upon itself, and **observes** its own **actions** about those **ideas it has**, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things* (ibid., 69-70). The MIND AS A PERSON ***has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts**, infinitely beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it with: but all this still confined to those simple ideas, which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions* (ibid., 97); it ***has thus to order*** *the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will* (ibid., 142). It has the ability *to consider several of* [simple ideas] *united together, as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it self has **join'd** them* (ibid., 97). It adjusts to the grandeur of the topic or object: ***their minds be overlaid*** *by an object too large and mighty **to be surveyed and managed by them*** (ibid., 132). In verbalizing MIND AS A PERSON we can also infer some qualities and characteristics of human beings: *how **covetous the mind** is, to be **furnished** with all such ideas* (ibid., 84). Since the mind embraces and considers all possible objects from the real world, it is only natural that the container is enlarged up to the world itself. The ideas are compared to the shadows of clouds in the ground, thus the schema is enriched with metaphors, cf.: *ideas **in the mind** quickly **fade**, and often **vanish quite out** of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves than*

shadows do flying over fields of corn; and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there (ibid., 88).

A complex blend arises in a combination of the CONTAINER schema with the MIND AS A MACHINE that is not evident in the text of Locke's work and forming a fraction of all the examples mainly combined with a noun *operation* or a verb *to operate*. The mind basically works not as a mechanism, but as a plant or a factory (being the container as well) aiming at operating on various kinds of evolving simple or complex ideas, e.g.: *These simple ideas, **the materials of all our knowledge**, are suggested and **furnished to the mind**, only by those two ways above mentioned: viz. sensation and reflection* (ibid., 64).

Surprisingly, the image Locke is famous for – the human mind is a sort of a BLANK SLATE or WHITE PAPER, on which experience writes – was not that renowned but rather vivid. The examples in the text verbalizing these metaphors are united under the SURFACE image schema with paper being the metaphoric realization of the general cognitive pattern dating back to Plato, cf.: the other examples of this kind: *Let us then suppose **the mind** to be, as we say, **white paper,** void of all characters, **without any ideas.** How comes it to be furnished?* (ibid., 54); *but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so **imprinting** no idea on the mind, there follows no sensation* (ibid., 83).

Finally, we can conclude that the general representation of *mind* in Locke's work relies on two major schemas: a CONTAINER and a PERSON. They get combined with and influence each other as they most naturally intermingle.

4.1.2 The description of MIND *in Hume's work "A treatise of human nature"*

Hume developed the conception of the mind viewed as a 'commonwealth of perceptions' in his paper "A treatise of human nature" (1738-40). Due to the discoveries in the field of natural sciences, like many other scholars the philosopher aspired to become the "Newton of the mind" (Schliesser 2007). He wanted to outline and develop the basic or universal laws of consciousness and to show how it functions. Hume proposed the way of "the organization of the mind" seeing the problems through "the sharp eye of mind", and speaking about how ideas get into the mind by means of sensory representations: "the only way in which an idea can get into the mind" (Morris & Brown 2001).

He starts his work with outlining the classification of ideas as the basic elements of human consciousness, setting the tune for the whole book and relying on the complex image of a CONTAINER with the ideas like animate beings getting into the mind or consciousness: *All the **perceptions of** the human **mind** resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call **'impressions' and 'ideas'**. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees **of force and liveliness** with which they **strike upon the mind**, and make their **way into our thought or consciousness*** (Hume 1960: 1). Here, the mind is represented as the first kind of the CONTAINER with its enclosed space of surface and to a certain extent opposed to thought and consciousness. Human thought and consciousness form the inner domain of the second CONTAINER as they use the already established ideas and do not form the new ones. Impressions enter the mind with a greater power, yet ideas get into a thought or consciousness in a milder way. The ideas have force and getting into the mind is pictured in a physical way, yet by ideas he means *the faint images of these in **thinking and reasoning*** (Hume 1960: 1) applying force to the container boundaries. This example reveals that though the container is the predominant scheme, much more complex relationship between the schemas and shifts of focus arise in the discourse.

We analyzed all the 610 contexts of the word *mind* in Hume's text and tried to classify each case according to a particular image schema. Sometimes, the mental model reconstructed on the basis of Hume's text is very complicated, inter-contradictory, yet several basic image schemas could be outlined: MIND AS A CONTAINER, A SURFACE, AN OPERATING MACHINE, A PERSON, A SURFACE, A MOVING OBJECT, PART-WHOLE, and A SUPER FORCE. However, we should note that in many cases it is difficult to decide on a particular image schema as they are so tightly related to each other and get transformed into each other in one and the same passage. The reason for it might be that image schemas are dynamic and they are still in a state of mutual interrelation in discourse. In Hume's treatise, the most numerous are three schemas – MIND AS A CONTAINER, A PERSON and A SURFACE represented in figure 1 in blue colour. They seem to work synergistically together, making the task of distinguishing one from another sometimes complicated.

Our analysis shows that MIND AS A CONTAINER is the most abundant schema. This is the most general interpretation, yet in different parts of the book and in different passages, it is featured differently. Mind could be as big as the whole world, or a commonwealth, or a country/empire, or medium as the stage in a theatre: *Nor is the **empire of the will** over our **mind** more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou'd not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction. **We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond that lose all empire over it*** (ibid., 632). It is capable of embracing the whole physical world. The ideas get "spread out" to the full in the MIND-CONTAINER, reaching the hypothetical boundaries of the container: '*Tis evident I can never account for this phænomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances, without **spreading out** in my **mind** the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries, according to **my memory and observation*** (ibid., 196). A peculiar blend arises from a combination of two metaphors based on a CONTAINER image schema: MIND AS A WORLD and WORLD AS A THEATRE. The ongoing succession

of perceptions is compared to a theatre performance, which will become one of Hume's most popular ideas: *The **mind is a kind of theatre**, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; **pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle** in an infinite variety of postures and situations* (ibid., 253).

The mind is viewed as a CONTAINER filled not with some stuff, but certain ideas moving in the human mind point at categorization process represented by inanimate objects: *That we may fix the meaning of the word, figure, we may **revolve in our mind** the ideas of circles, squares, parallelograms, triangles of different sizes and proportions, and may not rest on one image or idea* (ibid., 22). Therefore, it can be medium in volume as a stage in a theatre or as small as a camera in some apparatus. The analysis shows that a greater volume of the *mind* corresponds to its greater capacity as a CONTAINER and may be transformed into a SURFACE and even shrink to a POINT, when it stops fulfilling its function. Interestingly, being a point the *mind* can still be a sphere without boundaries as we observe in the following example: *they* [new probabilities] *must equally subvert it, and by the opposition, either of contrary thoughts or sensations, **reduce the mind to a total uncertainty*** (ibid., 184). This dynamic character of image schema allows the polyphony of interpretations and two image schemas may start working together. The CONTAINER merges with MACHINE schema making it a distinct subcategory: *There **enters nothing into** this **operation of the mind** but a present impression* (ibid., 101).

Within this commonwealth, the mind itself may move and work with certain objects. On the intersection of MIND AS A PERSON and MIND AS A MACHINE appears MIND AS A FORCE with *creative power* (ibid., 84).

The mind being mainly a CONTAINER, it has the interior that allows the movements inside it. Moreover, the mind can become a moving object – a TRAJECTOR itself and: *the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other* (ibid., 99). The mind

is conceptualized as a PERSON: *this uniting principle among ideas is not to be consider'd as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude, that without it* **the mind cannot join two ideas***; for nothing is more free than that faculty* (ibid., 10).

All the mentioned conceptual metaphors as well as image schemas are presented in Fig. 2. The lines stand for the established correlations and arrows show the changes the image schemas can experience.


Figure 2. The development in schematic representation of *mind* through image schemas in Hume's work

All the results of both Locke and Hume taken together allow us to draw the following conclusion. The conceptual representation of *mind* in philosophical works of the two great intellectuals is generally similar, but at the same time having notable peculiarities determined by the socio-historical changes in the society and a greater importance of industrialization with the growing role of machines in the times of Hume. A significant redistribution of frequency of occurrence in schemas happens in the sphere of MIND AS A CONTAINER, MIND AS A PERSON, and MIND AS A MACHINE.

4.1.3 The description of MIND *in Paine's works*

Paine's "The age of reason" represents a curious blend of what he took from the earlier writers on the human mind. Yet, he is concerned with religion first and foremost, therefore the pathos of his work is less philosophical and more political. The basic image schemas are naturally very similar to Locke's and Hume's respective schemas, but the focus of his writing is different. Paine criticizes religion and tries to prove it to be redundant in the period when science takes over. Therefore, the science is described as a natural preoccupation of a human being and mind takes the leading role in determining the human morals and actions: *My own mind is my own church* (Paine 1945a: 464). This is a non-conventional realization of the CONTAINER image schema, as in the text it is accompanied with the metaphoric expression. He distinguished between two types of ideas – those *we produce in ourselves by reflection and the act of thinking*, *and those that **bolt into the mind** of their own accord* (ibid., 497).

Some other ideas about mind that shaped the American discourse were the natural interest of any human being in science: *The human **mind** has a natural disposition to scientific knowledge and to the things connected with it* (ibid., 492). Or *the **natural bent of my mind** was to science* (ibid., 496).

4.2 The semantics of the early use of CONSCIOUSNESS *and its description in the works of Locke and Hume*

The Latin adjective *conscious* was used as far as in "Merlin" (1465) prose romance in opposition to the concepts of appearance and mind: *yef thi conscyence be soche as the semblaunce…* (MED). English adopted it for broad use in 1600. In 1632, Massinger wrote in "The maid of honour": *The **consciousness** of mine own wants, alas! sir, // We are not parallels; but, like lines divided, // Can ne'er meet in one centre* (1813: 24). English started to use the word *consciousness* in 1630 in the meaning of "internal knowledge", and in 1670 the "state of being aware of what passes in one′s own mind"(OED). The philosophical thought gradually developed the meaning registered

in the Oxford English Dictionary: "5a. The totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings, which make up a person's conscious being" (OED). But the noun *consciousness* in its philosophical terminological sense appeared somewhat later. As far as we can see, the English term *consciousness* is strongly connected with the terminology of Plotinus' philosophical psychology, being a linguistic calque from Greek *συναίσθησις* (*Sunaisthêsis*) in Latin. The term is "the most ubiquitous type of consciousness in Plotinus' psychology...The fundamental role of sunaisthêsis is to produce unity by constituting the subject as a coherent and structured whole" (Hutchinson 2018: 41). The Cambridge Platonist Cudworth translated *συναίσθησις* as "consciousness" or "con-sense" and claimed that "the essence of cognition consists in express consciousness" (1678: 160; Carter 2010).

A unique contribution to the understanding of what makes an ordinary person a reasoning human being is Locke's theory of consciousness (91 examples in the essay). It eventually serves the foreground for high-order theories of consciousness when the subject is aware of his mental operations such as thinking and reasoning. A Lockean person *is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that* **consciousness***, which* **is inseparable from thinking***, and as it seems to me* **essential to it** (ibid., 208). The unique feature of Locke's conception is that all mental states for him are conscious, thus it is central to his further description of thinking capacities. This is, roughly speaking, some kind of meta-perception, i.e. the perception of perception: **Consciousness** *is the perception of what* **passes** *in a man's own mind* (ibid., 61). Moreover, consciousness fundamentally lays the ground for individual identity: **Consciousness** *always accompanies* **thinking***, and 'tis makes every one to be, what he calls 'self'; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things* (ibid., 208).

Thiel summarized the theory of consciousness: "for Locke, 'being conscious' denotes an immediate awareness that is an integral part of all acts of thinking as such… According to Locke, the mind relates to itself in the sense that it observes its own operations and produces ideas of them..." (2011: 114-115). Locke is even more straightforward in putting consciousness at the foundation of personal identity in the following passage: *For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances* (ibid., 209).

Speaking about the image schemas linguistically evoked in the scrutinized text, we could say that the general picture seems to be rather predictable given its importance of personal identity. It is the OBJECT image schema that is predominant in Locke's essay when the concept of consciousness is seen as some kind of object you can *have, transfer, relocate* and you can have the *lack of* (Fig. 3). At the same time, it is still conceptualized as a PERSON with consciousness that can accompany the human, be present and perform certain actions such as uniting ideas. This conceptualization takes the second place in Locke's work as well as the dominant position in Hume's treatise. The CONTAINER image schema represents *consciousness* with space within, through which you can do something and it is capable of changing its volume, i.e. extending.

Figure 3. A comparative representation of *consciousness* in Locke and Hume's works

Hume albeit famous for his claim that *self or person is not any one impression* (Hume 1960: 251), because "*when **I enter most intimately into what I call myself**, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. **I never can catch myself** at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception*" (ibid., 252); he also connects self with consciousness. The philosopher writes, that *pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same object. This object is **self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions**, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness* (ibid., 277) and *the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always **intimately present with us**, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it* (ibid., 317). This is but apparently a contradiction: in fact, Hume rejected a bundle theory of the 'self', verbalized in the first claims and further stated that "*all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our **thought or consciousness.** I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head*" (ibid., 636).

Yet, Hume made the connection between consciousness and other capacities clearer, and there are numerous contexts where he specifies his ideas by bringing together the following words: *thought or consciousness, consciousness or memory, consciousness or sensation, memory and consciousness*. Like in: "*But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions **in our thought or consciousness***" (ibid., 637).

The concept of consciousness in Paine's writing does not occupy a prominent place. It is mainly connected with acknowledging the existence of a human being, and is supposed to provide the basis for immortality: *But all other arguments apart, the **consciousness of existence** is the only conceivable idea we can have of another life, and the continuance of that **consciousness is immortality*** (Paine 1945a: 591). Practically, the only schema realized in a few examples is a CHARACTERISTIC feature.

4.3 UNDERSTANDING*: from a concept in ordinary speech to a term in philosophy*

The spatial conceptualization of mental entities verbalized in the words representing mental sphere and cognitive capacities, that we have seen in numerous examples scrutinized above, is naturally not the invention of the Age of Reason. Rather, it is primarily connected with the most archaic conceptualizations of the cognized and non-cognized space. Understanding or cognizing the object means placing it into the focus of attention in space. The etymology of the verb *to understand*, which originated from the Old English *understandan*, which meant "comprehend, grasp the idea of", which in its turn was related to the verb *-standan* "to stand" and the prefix *under-*, and that is why "stand in the midst of" (OED). This is a much more general semantic principle accounting for certain regularities in cognitive information processing. Some other examples of the kind might include *suppose* – from Latin "put or place under", *intend* – from Latin "stretch out, extend", and many others. Even in Middle English, the lexeme *understanding* had positive connotations, as in the following example of 1440 being used with truth: *so trouthe is receyued in-to our **vnderstandynge*** (MED).

The general meaning of "power or ability to understand; intellect, intelligence" was widely used in English, yet further through this meaning the word *understanding* got endowed with certain terminological connotations. This semantic shift in the meaning soon influenced the everyday language use as those "capable of understanding, intelligent, capable of judging with knowledge" (OED) were called *the men of understanding*. The newly coined phrase came into the public discourse in the following centuries. In 1772 Boston Gazette of 3 August, we find the following example: **Men of understanding** *view the Governor's Speech as an impertinent sophistical Piece of Toryism* (OED).

4.3.1 The description of UNDERSTANDING *in Locke's "An essay concerning human understanding"*

In the philosophy of Enlightenment, the term *understanding* was quite popular and meant comprehension as one of the aspects of human mental activity. Locke wrote in his "An essay concerning human understanding" that his primary goal was to show *whence the **understanding** may **get** all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees **they may come into the mind*** (Locke 2008: 54).

Still, based on the analysis of all the 308 examples from the text, we could outline three major image schemas: a PERSON (104 tokens), a CONTAINER (107), and an OBJECT (41). As for the other words elucidated, we reveal that in many examples personification of mental processes is revealed in the verbs usually used to denote people rather than abstract notions and a combination of several schemas is noted. In many cases, the example becomes rather complex through the use of metaphors and with *understanding* this metaphorical load turns out to be more pronounced than with the other words studied.

In the example below, we observe a dynamic representation of *understanding* seen as a world (interpreted as a CONTAINER schema) with mental operations and visions

floating and an individual simultaneously performing the actions. Moreover, the abstract notions become creatures of this world: *And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late, before most children get **ideas of the operations of their own minds**; and some have not any very clear, or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like **floating visions**, they make not deep impressions enough, to leave in the mind clear distinct lasting ideas, **till the understanding turns inwards upon it self**, reflects on its own operations, and **makes them the object of its own contemplation** (ibid., 57). The understanding of a human is finite *in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion* (ibid., 121).

So, the understanding can be active or passive in acquitting materials processed into knowledge. This is realized through a PERSON image schema: *In this part, the **understanding is merely passive**; and whether or no, it will have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not **in its own power*** (ibid., 63). Through the PERSON image schema the metaphor of UNDERSTANDING AS A HUMAN BEING is realized, thus it can have an eye, and thus *see, judge, make acquaintance, obey, and perceive*. Viewing it as an OBJECT makes it possible to use it right or even use as a metaphor of the dress that can go well with the cognized things: *things to which our **understandings** are not suited* (ibid., 14).

The intrinsic duality of the processes of understanding is based on the fact that we operate with mental entities being the reflections or signs of the actual events or objects of the real world. This semiotic duality is the key challenge as well as the source of inspiration for various metaphors in Locke's text. The UNDERSTANDING AS A MIRROR, capable of reflecting the real world with a certain precision, is a metaphor gaining a special significance in the text: *These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the **Understanding** can **no more refuse** to **have**, nor **alter**, when they are **imprinted**, nor **blot** them out, and make new ones in it self, than a **mirror** can **refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas, which, the objects set before it, do therein produce** (ibid., 63).

Another rather conventional way of portraying understanding as a CONTAINER is as follows: *These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. For, methinks, the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with only some little **openings** left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without; would the **pictures coming into such a dark Room** but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them* (ibid., 96). Here Locke uses the metaphor of a drawer with numerous blocks and minor containers as a particular case of the CONTAINER image schema. This metaphor works as a constituent part of a complex metaphor, i.e. comparing the process of understanding to the light reaching some of the inner spaces of the drawer. This image is not particularly frequent yet rather consistent as in another context where we read about *the light infused into their understandings* (ibid., 452).

Vision and seeing becomes the ground for various image schema blends like PERSON and SURFACE: *to make the **understanding** see, what is originally engraven in it* (ibid., 20) (Fig. 4).


Figure 4. A schematic representation of *understanding* in Locke's and Hume's works

The quantitative analysis demonstrates the difference between Locke's and Hume's conceptualization of *understanding*. While Locke prefers PERSON and CONTAINER image schemas, Hume focuses on other characteristics, leaving personification to *reason*.

4.3.2 The description of UNDERSTANDING *in Hume's work "A treatise of human nature"*
The concept of understanding was of particular importance to Hume, so he even changed the focus of the title. His work "An enquiry concerning human understanding" of 1748 appeared nearly a decade later than the work we mainly subject to our analysis – "A treatise of human nature". This was the first philosophical work that used the term *understanding* in its title, presuming it to be the most important concept that seeks further detailed elaboration. Yet as his lengthy treatise arose little interest from the reading public, Hume understood that it needed a more succinct verbalization.

The work under scrutiny opens up with a chapter on the understanding and starts with defining the object of study – the man through his capacity to reason. Along with the established tradition, *understanding* in Hume's text can be generalized in a CONTAINER image schema: *I am afraid, that such an enterprise **is beyond the reach of human understanding,** and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to the senses* (Hume 1960: 64). Interestingly enough, invoking the CONTAINER schema (Fig. 4), Hume pays more attention to its boundaries and even outside, beyond the moderate capacities of pure reasoning as passions and actions leave the distinct territory of understanding: *Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, 'tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to **go beyond** the calm and indolent judgments of **the understanding*** (ibid., 457).

Two representations are prominent in Hume's work "A treatise of human nature": the personification of the processes of understanding and building up its characteristics.

The understanding thus can be *perfect* or *full* and it is possible to talk about the nature of understanding, its principles, faculties, efforts, and force: …***wherein the nature of our understanding**, and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects* (ibid., 182).

The most striking thing is that the schema SOURCE is more prominent in Hume's text compared to Locke's: *we shall find upon examination, that they are at the bottom considerably different from each other, and that this inference **arises from the understanding**, and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner* (ibid., 197).

The nature of understanding is presented as something stable and at the same time ambiguous and vague which is indicated several times: *The imagination or **understanding**, call it which you please, fluctuates betwixt the opposite views; and tho' perhaps it may be oftner turn'd to the one side than the other, 'tis impossible for it, by reason of the opposition of causes or chances, to rest on either* (ibid., 440).

As Paine largely elaborated on the notion of *reason* rather than the other philosophical notions, we cannot state that he suggested any distinguishing vision of *understanding*. The few examples found in his text are closer to the ordinary linguistic use rather to some philosophical discourse. Yet, some interesting cases of CONTAINER schemas are highlighted: *their* [of principles] *place of mental residence is the understanding* (Paine 1945a: 497).

4.4 REASON *as the key concept of the Enlightenment in Locke's, Hume's, and Paine's works*

Etymologically, the noun *reason* originated from the Latin *rationem* (nom. *ratio*). It appeared in the English language in the 13th century and comes from Old French *reisun* as "a statement of some fact (real or alleged) employed as an argument to justify or condemn some act, prove or disprove some assertion, idea, or belief" (OED). In the second meaning, the word was used quite often: "A statement, narrative, or speech; a

saying, observation, or remark; an account or explanation of, or answer to, something" (OED). Chaucer used this word without an article and meant "talk or discourse": *But I se now that þou art weerey with the lengthe of my reson* (OED). Originally, *reason* had neither separate nor supreme value of all cognitive abilities it gained further: "In the Middle Ages, to be sure, *reason* stood as a sort of junior partner to a higher source of truth, "revelation," which operated to guide and correct it. And the exercise of reason depended on training in a large body of philosophical and theological writings that "conveyed the truths that reason and revelation had accumulated over the centuries" (Smith 2006: 19).

These two meanings were frequent up to the 17th century when they gradually became rarely possible due to the prominence of another meaning *reason* acquired in the works of Enlightenment. The Oxford English Dictionary registers the following meaning highlighting that it is fixed in logics: "one of the premises in an argument; esp. the minor premise when placed after the conclusion" (OED). It manifested a considerable shift from a material fact potentially exploited in argumentation to an abstract 'object' valid to be used in argumentation conforming to the principles of logic. Rationality devoid of "superstition, mythology, fear and revelation, which is often based on mathematical 'truth', which calibrates ends to means, which is therefore technological, and expects solutions to problems which are objectively correct" (Outram 2013: 6).

Reasoning is thus the process of gaining knowledge of a higher order. It does not emerge on its own, but results from the development of logical thinking as long as animals and children do not exhibit this kind of mental activity. *He that attentively consider the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge* (Locke 2008: 56). Since reasoning was suggested as an antidote for all possible kinds of authorities and beliefs, it is defined *as contradistinguished to faith, <…> which the*

mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz. by sensation or reflection (ibid., 445).

Reason and *reasoning* were not yet the key terms to unite all the philosophical ideas in Locke's theory, despite he paid considerable attention to them. In our analysis, we have identified 667 examples with the main meaning similar to an argument in a discourse of proving the point advocated by the writer, thus pointing to the image schema of CAUSE. When he talks about what reasoning is and how to comprehend it, Locke uses the words connected with space, thus evoking the image schema of CONTAINER with the profiled bounding surfaces. Interestingly, considering that reason may instrumentally refer to an OBJECT, that could be used, employed, the person could have, be with, or deprived of.

The most important thing about reasoning is that it pertains only to human beings and is largely lacking in animals, thus stressing the high level of abstraction in processing various types of ideas: *And therefore I think we may suppose, That 'tis in this, that the species of brutes are discriminated from man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, **and are not bare machins** (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to **have some reason*** (ibid., 95).

The metaphor that we outlined, though it was not particularly abundant, is REASON IS LIGHT (7 instances). In Locke's text, *reason* is closely connected with understanding and all the other investigated words. They refer to mental capacities and image schemas behind the verbal plane, forming a cohesive structure with clear interrelations. Given that *understanding* is viewed as a cabinet (drawer) that is difficult to see into, *reason* is a lamp emitting light, making the process of cognizing the human being easier. The light *dispels darkness* and the human compared to *a dim candle* is in opposition to *the sun, celestial ray* of eternal mind-God. Light and particularly the light of reason

became the cornerstone metaphor for further discourse about the Enlightenment period itself. In the following example we identify a well-developed metaphor: *reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the* **light infused into their Understandings***, and cannot be mistaken; 'tis clear and visible there; like the light of bright sunshine, shews it self, and needs no other Proof, but its own Evidence* (ibid., 452). *Understanding* for Locke has the superior level and in this respect is close to *reason* (Fig. 5) and they are both used in the same contexts.


Figure 5. Schematic representation of *reason* in Locke's and Hume's works

The first thing that immediately strikes when we start analyzing Hume is the drastic quantitative discrepancy in using this term compared to his predecessor. The word *reason* is used 665 times in his "Treatise" that is more than ten times higher (Fig. 5) then in Locke's essay. In many contexts, it still fulfils the same function of ordinary language – serving as a cause in an argumentation. Still the discourse analysis reveals that it gradually amounts to a key term and the over-arching concept for other mental capacities, verbalized by the words *mind* and *understanding*. Hume set out to investigate "the role that reason plays in belief and action" (Winters 1979: 20). Reason

can influence our actions and beliefs by informing us of causal relations between the objects of thought and on the real world: *All kinds of **reasoning** consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other* (ibid., 73). Together with Locke, Hume thinks that animals have some other kind of reason that is fundamentally different from the human capacity. Therefore, the OBJECT schema is recognizable too – human being can have it as some kind of an object or tool (instrument) to reveal these causal relations (Fig. 5). The metaphor of building with reason being the source of ideas and judgments is also quite prominent: *certain ideas, which are the true foundation of all our reasoning* (ibid., 53) or *the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation* (ibid., 91).

Investigating into the issue of reason would be useful for further research. Moreover, reason becomes endowed with a special importance that is enhanced with the help of the metaphor: *that can come before **the tribunal of human reason**, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them* (ibid., xvii). The metaphors of a strict judge and a queen appear in numerous contexts. These images are united by the same authority: *Reason first appears in possession of the **throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims**, with an absolute sway and **authority**. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take shelter under her protection, and by making use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of reason, produces, in a manner, a patent under her hand and seal* (ibid., 186).

Based on our analysis, we could state that some blended schemas like SOURCE and PERSON emerge in the discourse: *But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals* (ibid., 458).

The CONTAINER schema is rather frequent in Hume's works, especially verbalized by the word *reasoning*. According to Hume, humans may have errors: *any error in our*

reasoning (ibid., 452). Probably, since the early writings of the first philosophers the human cognitive life was considered too complex to be seen as a separate world: *the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty* (ibid., xxi). Reasoning conceptualized in terms of a CONTAINER can work with the ideas within and even beyond its boundaries: *the same **reasoning** extends to identity* (ibid., 74).

The examples with metaphoric expressions reveal the particular features of the reasoning process with a greater precision. The conceptual metaphors like REASON AS A CURRENT or REASON AS A FLOW each complement the basic image schema employed. Since reason and reasoning are perceived as dynamic processes, the PATH schema is evoked more often than GOAL or SOURCE in SOURCE– PATH – GOAL schema: *they follow more directly the current of reason and good sense* (ibid., 525). *Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning* (ibid., 552). Blended schemas like SOURCE combined with PERSON also appear to be prominent in the text: *But reason has no such influence. Moral distinctions, therefore, are not **the offspring of reason**. **Reason** is wholly inactive, and can never **be the source** of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals* (ibid., 553).

The vital importance of reason was specially verbalized in the American discourse precisely because "the whole point of 'reason' was to free us from the moral and epistemic corruption that pervades culture and received tradition" (Smith 2006:16). In other words, reason had to liberate from the accepted and widespread beliefs in all spheres of human activity including the mental constructs of social inequality and freedom.

The notion *reason* was brought to an unprecedented importance in America in Paine's book "The age of reason" in 1794. The author viewed reasoning not only at pure logical reasoning as the basis of human cognitive and thus governmental processes, but also

introduced the rhetoric of struggling with tenets and rules of the older age. This highly polemical and controversial work criticized religion and the contemporary organization of church. Moreover, it proclaimed the superiority of the human mind capable of making life better in all spheres: be it social or religious, not simply personified, but deified: *It is only by the **exercise of reason**, that man can discover god. **Take away that reason**, and he would be **incapable of understanding** anything* (Paine 1945a: 484). For Paine, reason was conceptualized by means of a military metaphor REASON AS A WEAPON. Thus it enriched and complemented the image schema of an OBJECT used by the writers of the Old World. Reason was a special, supreme power, conquering and harmonizing all social and even religious fallacies, so in the preface to the treatise he wrote Reason with a capital letter: *The most formidable **weapon** against errors of every kind is **reason*** (ibid., 463): *The Christian theory is little else than the idolatry of the ancient mythologists, accommodated to the purposes of power and revenue; and it **yet remains to reason and philosophy to abolish the amphibious fraud*** (ibid., 467). It is possible to sum up that Paine follows the pathway of the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Still, in his writing many image schemas are enriched, accompanied by novel metaphors, and the discourse of opposition and fight is brought to the fore.

4.5 Summarizing the major representations in Enlightenment philosophy: on the crossroads of European and American thinking

The philosophers of the British Enlightenment – Locke and Hume – represented their views on the problems of the human mind and thinking. They are revealed mostly by some common and prominent image schemas that we reconstructed based on the analysis of the contexts where all the studied language units denoting cognitive capacities were observed. The image schema of a CONTAINER is the most frequent among other schemas in the writings of Enlightenment philosophers. This trend could be explained by the fundamental role of the category of space in human psychological and mental sphere. Space is highly anthropocentric. As an ontological entity, it includes a human being and those things he tries to perceive in the reality with the help of

language as "the play of verbal symbols" implying the wealth of physical experience we find "in our mind's eye" (Palmer 1996: 3). This play is provided by special mental and naming structures, operations and mechanisms in the human brain, which work in dynamics and serve the purpose of communication.

The other prominent image schemas based on conceptual metaphors included PERSON, MACHINE, GOAL, OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, SOURCE, and PROCESS. These schemas "capture the structural contours of sensory-motor experience, integrating information from multiple modalities" (Hampe 2005: 1-2). They are recurrent patterns within "typological neural maps for various sensory and motor areas of the brain" (Johnson 2005: 19) getting transforms from simpler images to more complex and abstract ones that are realized in each new context being culturally and historically dependent on powerful conceptual metaphors used by scholars in a slightly different way.


Figure 6. Quantitative analysis of the target words crucial for understanding
of the influence of Enlightenment on further developing discourse

Due to these easily understandable basic image schemas accompanied by conceptual metaphors, philosophical ideas were spreading across various types of discourse and were used for further reasoning in American public discourse. The basic terms belonging to the cognitive sphere demonstrated a steady rise in the Corpus of Historical American English especially in the 1820-40 (Fig. 6). As Johnson stressed, "the metaphysics of mind, which has become the common sense of much contemporary

philosophy of mind, is like all metaphysics, metaphoric, and its metaphors are very much with us today" (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 308).

5. Conceptual representations of mind in Twain's "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court"

The choice of Twain's work in our paper is not accidental, because the author tried to exemplify the huge impact of Enlightenment philosophy. We have already claimed above that his experience of interpreting the philosophy may amount to the experience of a generation. Scrutinizing the economic and political thought of the Twain's time, Rowe argues that though some ideas are represented in his works that are difficult to pin down to exact influences, it seems that something "had been telegraphed by the cultural unconscious that worked so fantastically through Twain" (1995: 215). Moreover, Twain's influence on American literature let some ideas sediment even further, accompanied by the bright artistic solutions and his personal attitude. Clements under the penname of Twain was most justly proclaimed to be "the first truly American writer" by Faulkner who stated that, "all of us since are his heirs" (1957: 88). Twain's works, invariably recognized by the lightness, irony, and satire, raised important historical as well as philosophical issues as he was not but influenced by the political and social issues burgeoning in his lifetime. The belief in human thought and nature were taken for granted in those times. The revolutionary passion with the notions of *reason, knowledge*, and *equality* were proclaimed to have worn away, yet many unsettled questions remained and were brought to social and political stage of the time. The long-standing tradition of anti-imperialism, first targeting Great Britain, a century later flourished in America itself. Here it was reflected in 'uses and abuses' of the 'new civilization' based on (or probably exquisitely covered by) the concept of reason.

A world-known novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" by Twain is a hilarious and witty parody on an outdated way of social organization and a battle with old superstitions approached through mythology. King Arthur is not only a

mythological hero, but a manifestation of Britishness and its monarchy, the American society has been in a vehement opposition to. Thus, Twain pictured king Arthur as a quintessence of everything resonating with the feudal society without liberty. It was the embodiment of imperialism as the "greatest influences on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American Arthuriana was the British laureate Alfred, Lord Tennyson" (Lupack 1999: xi), being the poet of Imperia both read and mocked. In this respect, Twain follows the tradition of making fun of Arthuriana idleness, yet he also read Malory's text. "A Connecticut Yankee…" was published in December 1889, but the intention to create a new book appeared much earlier – in 1884, while travelling with his friend – Washington Cable. During the trip, they bought a copy of Malory's original "Morte D'Arthur". After reading it, they both were inspired by the convoluted, archaic, and magnificent style of the author. Despite being too complicated and too idealizing, the reality of Medieval England and Arthur himself, the book possessed a certain charm. They started humorously to talk and send notes to each other in the imitation of Malory's language. By getting used to the language and the events narrated in the book, Twain understood the comic potential of blending the two worlds and started to "make notes in [his] head for a book" (Twain 2008: ix). Some passages "language and all" (Morris 2009:164) are even borrowed from Malory's work.

5.1 The Twain's novel in socio-historical and philosophical context

Going deeper, we may claim, that not only the worlds, but different conceptual worldviews with various conceptual constructs were challenged and clashed in the text. Given the rise of American literature and the public debate over the issues dating back to the Enlightenment, the novels of Twain seem to be a far more complicated source of thoughts and ideas than the opposition to the outdated Arthurian kingdom by perverting the classical image of knighthood (Komova & Sharapkova 2017) with a weak ruler. Hank Morgan being an innovator arrives to the kingdom and aims to associate the country with the glory of robust reasoning. Apart from the well-known plot lying behind the narration, the ideas concerning mind and intellect as well as Man

and the limits of his reason are being investigated, discussed and challenged in the artistic form. Twain had brought the philosophical ideas to the model world (Arthurian kingdom): what could happen if they were followed down to the last detail? Upon a close inspection, the novel turns out to feature some notable reflections into the power of reason as verbalized by Morgan. This literary situation unlocks putative problems of adopting this philosophy at face value. Turner stressed that:

> *narrative imagining – story – is the fundamental instrument of thought. Rational capacities depend upon it. It is our chief means of looking into the future, of predicting, of planning, and of explaining. It is a literary capacity indispensable to human cognition generally* (1996: 5).

So, Morgan, this 'Yankee of the Yankees', arrived to King Arthur's court and tried to change it in accordance with his position based on the cornerstones of practical reason and technology. Morgan conformed to the ideal manifested by de Crevecoeur: "He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient *prejudices and manners*, receives new ones from *the new mode of life* he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds" (de Crevecoeur, *s.a.*). Moreover, "the American is a *new man*, who *acts upon new principles*; he must therefore entertain new ideas and form new opinions" (ibid.).

Yankee is an attempt to elucidate the typical American with all the characteristics of a common representative of a newly born nation. Morgan begins his story by saying: *I am an American. I was born and reared in Hartford, in the State of Connecticut – anyway, just over the river, in the country. So I am a Yankee of the Yankees – and practical; yes, and nearly barren of sentiment, I suppose – or poetry, in other words* (Twain 2008: 10). Putting the word "Yankee" to the title of the book was a well-grounded decision providing both a social and historical marker. Yankee was first recorded in 1765 as a name for a settler of New England descended from the original English settlers of this region and afterwards used in the 18th century in this meaning. The first recorded use of the term by the British to refer to the Americans in general appears in the 1780s, in a letter by Lord Nelson. During the American Revolution,

American soldiers adopted this "term of derision as a term of national pride" (AHDEL): it referred to a citizen of New England. In other words, a Yankee has a definite link with the Old England. This name possesses certain historical connotations and helps to orient ourselves in American history. It also named a soldier who fought on the side of the Union during the American Civil War in 1865. In this war, people of the northern states were fighting against the southern states in order to stop slavery in the country. It left bitter memories and caused terrible destruction in the country. The conflicts were solved to some extent, but some questions remained. The notion of slavery had been put to its end and it was declared that the United States was one nation. Still the opposition of ideas and interests, if not military groups, continued for a long time.

Another issue brought to the fore in the novel is the attitude to science and technological progress. Twain wrote that science "is also the inner world of our thoughts and ideas" (Salomon 1961: 21). This 'inner' world was not always charitable and progressive in fact. And as industrialization was expanding, the disillusionment grew stronger and stronger. In the book, not only the Yankee's scientific miracles are almost as trivial as those of Merlin, but modern technological civilization in general is sharply satirized foreshadowing the prospective crisis.

This complex intellectual and social background makes the opposition in the book multidimensional. As a result, Twain's novel seems to be lacking a "single worldview," having "inconsistencies in the narrative strategy" (Mitchell 1999: 232), and Morgan's speech was thought to be too heterogeneous, like a "palimpsestic manuscript" (Morris 2009: 172). This perception arises as he verbalizes one worldview, mainly Enlightened and republican, yet with the action, unfolding it manifests Hank's will for despotic power culminating in becoming the Boss. In fact, through making Hank the speaker and "negotiating this fundamental division in his protagonist's character" (Rowe 1995: 205), Twain anticipates further criticism of American policy as bringing light to the 'hearts of darkness' of the last decade of the 19th and (early) 20th century. In other words,

he makes the disclosure of misinterpretation and even overinterpretation of ideas at the foundation of Yankee's actions acute and drastic not intervening with the reader's personal opinion.

Choosing the conceptual domain of mental capacities as the major focus, although not limiting to it, is also significant since the tactics of winning hearts and *minds* is shown in dynamics: as Rowe pinpoints, "controlling people's attitudes and values, either by encouraging their superstitions as the Church and Merlin do, or by manipulating public opinion, as Hank and Clarence do with their newspaper" (1995: 206).

Though Morgan speaks with many short and simple sentences filled with words belonging to jargon and colloquial language, the argument of exceptional simplicity of this character is controversial. The linguistic and conceptual analysis of his speech indicates that the discourse of Morgan abounds in many ideas about man, his mind, and reason – all formulated during the Enlightenment. Some key image schemas and conceptual metaphors about mind and reason are repeated through key words. Moreover, as we infer from the analysis, the words like *mind*, *reason*, and *understanding* play a special role in the text, marking the clash of worldviews. These words belonging to the domain of cognitive functions are usually found in Hank Morgan's direct or inner speech.

5.2 The representation of MIND *in Twain's novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court"*

In the novel, *mind* is conceptualized through the CONTAINER image schema. *Mind* in the novel is a special place uniting the characteristics of both a world and a machine, where ideas revolve, emerge, and get shaped. The central part of mind is the one where the brain's work takes place, while the periphery is where some ideas may be left to be returned further. *Meantime there was one thing*, *which had **got pushed into the background of my mind*** (Twain 2008: 39). It would be even more precise to interpret

mind not just through a CONTAINER schema but through the metaphor of MIND AS A WORKSHOP, where all reasoning proceeds allowing the ideas to get further onto the consciousness: *Wherefore, **the "deal"** which had been for some time **working into shape in my mind** was of a quite different pattern from the Cade-Tyler sort* (ibid., 94). The image schema of a CONTAINER is usually accompanied by the GOAL – ideas get into it to be further processed: *You see, it was the eclipse. **It came into my mind** in the nick of time, how Columbus, or Cortez, or one of those people, played an eclipse as a saving trump once, on some savages, and I saw my chance* (ibid., 35). Mainly the interior of this schema is profiled and not the borders, yet the person is capable of changing what is going to be processed in the mind by means of casting it out of it: *now shoved this whole problem clear out of my mind* (ibid., 18). Thus, we have specified the representation of the CONTAINER with more attention paid to the exterior (Fig. 7). More complex ideas merge with the simpler ones such as the set expressions – to be in one's right mind, make up the mind, change the mind.


Figure 7. The frequency of word occurrence of *mind, consciousness, reason*, and *understanding*, and image-schemas in Twain's novel

In accordance with the conceptions about mind, verbalized by the philosophers of the Enlightenment and mostly resembling Locke, Twain writes: ***Across my mind*** *flitted the dear image of a certain hello-girl of West Hartford, and I wished she could see me now* (2008: 310). Mind is susceptible to change, it sees the world, the commonwealth, or country with a set order that could still be revolutionized: *This was not the sort of experience for a statesman to encounter who **was planning out a peaceful revolution in his mind*** (ibid., 141).

Taking into account the fiction character of the text, the PERSON image schema is rather prominent and *mind* can *be present*, *humble, could attack and approach*, *miscarry and encounter some new ideas*. *Mind* undergoes the metonymic change from a part to the whole that could be smitten like the person himself: *God hath surely smitten the mind of this farmer* (ibid., 271).

As it follows from the text, the minds of native inhabitants of Arthurian kingdom have outdated working areas which need reshaping or modernization of the machinery. That is what Morgan intends to do in the kingdom, e.g.: ***Old habit of mind*** *is one of the toughest things to get away from in the world. It transmits itself like physical form and feature; and for a man, in those days, to have had an idea that his ancestors hadn't had, would have brought him under suspicion of being illegitimate* (ibid., 163). Mental capacities of the habitats of Arthurian kingdom are valued very low and their mind is considered either at rest or as a not properly working machine: *Well, I was stunned; partly with this unlooked – for stupidity on his part, and partly because his fellows so manifestly sided with him and were of his mind – if you **might call it mind;** She walked indolently along, **with a mind at rest**, its peace reflected in her innocent face* (ibid., 14). Since mind could be compared to a machine, it could break: *Weeks dragged by, she watching, waiting, hoping, her mind going slowly to **wreck** under the burden of her misery* (ibid., 285).

One crucial thing that appeared in the works of the Enlightenment is distinguishing mind from other forms of mental capacities, such as reason and consciousness, which are closer connected with personal identity: *I had something **on my mind** that my **conscience** kept prodding me about, and wouldn't let me forget. If I had the remaking of man, he wouldn't have any **conscience*** (ibid., 128). Viewing the mind as a substance and as a container was in close connection to the major ideas of the Enlightenment.

In Twain's later work "What is man?" (1906), he just puts some ideas clearer and presents them as another indirect proof of being greatly inspired by the ideas circulating in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Twain even thinks that a human can hardly change the way his mind-machine works as it is designed in a way that is difficult to manipulate. The reason that it is operated by outside forces does not always follow the will inside. It automatically obeys the laws it dwells on. In the essay, the image schema of mind as a CONTAINER is combined with a metaphor of MACHINE, which is developed further. This idea was not by any means original. Moreover, it was fully within the discourse of what Enlightenment philosophers thought about the human mind. The representation of MIND AS A MACHINE is discussed in the form of dichotomies in a dialogue between the old and a young man having a lot in common with Hume:

> *Personally you did not create even the smallest microscopic fragment of the materials out of which your opinion is made; and personally you cannot claim even the slender merit of putting the borrowed materials together. That was done automatically by your **mental machinery**, in strict accordance with the **law of that machinery's construction**. And you not only did not make that **machinery yourself**, but you have **not even any command over it**.*
>
> *I am sorry, but you see, yourself, that your **mind is merely a machine**, nothing more. You have no command over it, it has no command over itself it is worked solely from the outside. **That is the law of its make; it is the law of all machines*** (Clements 1973: 128-129).

We can also find this deterministic or automatic view of mind in Twain's letter to Sir John Adams in 1897, in which he wrote that "mind originates nothing, creates nothing, gathers all its materials from the outside and weaves them into combination automatically" (Harris 2013: 512).

5.3 The role of CONSCIOUSNESS *and* UNDERSTANDING *in Twain's novel*

The constituent elements of human nature, namely *consciousness* and *understanding* are personalized in the text. Moreover, a Yankee shows awareness over various phenomena in human thinking like consciousness and reason. Thiel concludes the semantic analysis of the word in the 17th century by stating that "consciousness is a separate reflective act of the mind directed toward one's own mental states providing some sort of knowledge of those mental states" (2011: 85).

Within the context of the novel, *consciousness* is represented in a different way comparing to *reason* or *mind. The* CONTAINER *becomes the most dominant schema: I seemed to believe the boy, I didn't know why.* **SOMETHING in me seemed to believe him – my consciousness***, as you may say; but* **my reason didn't** (Twain 2008: 16); *I knew, then, how a mother feels when women, whether strangers or friends, take her new baby, and close themselves about it with one eager impulse, and bend their heads over it in a tranced adoration that makes all the rest of the universe* **vanish out of their consciousness** *and be as if it were not, for that time* (ibid., 210).

It should be stressed that philosophical ideas did not influence much the understanding of *consciousness* in the novel. Apart from some examples, where Morgan claims *consciousness* to be different from other mental capacities and tied with personality, we cannot find anything pointing at a distinct philosophical legacy. Probably this fact can be explained by the fact that the theory of conciseness was better elaborated by Locke and partially by Hume, but it was not adopted by American writers like the concept of *reason* was. The latter turned out to be more popular in American interpretations. This is why Yankee uses it to describe the process of understanding of those living in Arthurian kingdom: *But presently one man looked up and asked me to state that proposition again; and state it slowly, so it could* **soak into his understanding** (ibid., 94). Again, the understanding is viewed as a container where the information is absorbed and processed slowly. *Gradually, as the time wore along,* **one**

annoying fact was borne in upon my understanding *– that we were weather-bound* (ibid., 85).

5.4 The description of REASON *and its linguistic peculiarities in Twain's novel*
Reason constituted the most important notion for the linguistic portrayal of Yankee and for depicting the opposition of the worlds and worldviews laid down in the title of the novel. The notion of rational thinking is verbalized by *reason* as the personification of the capacity to think, to know, and then to act.

According to the views of Enlightenment philosophers, the presence of logical reasoning or thinking according to strict rules distinguished a human being from an animal. Animals were given some type of reasoning, yet it was not compatible with humans. Archaic civilizations at their dawn were believed not to have this type of thinking, so they were compared to children. And this is how Yankee describes the inhabitants of medieval England. In his inner monologues, we find the collocations such as: 'white Indians', 'mere animals', 'children', 'donkeys': *These animals didn't* ***reason****; that they never put this and that together; that all their talk showed that they* ***didn't know*** *a discrepancy when they saw it; Why,* ***her eyes*** *were as grateful as* ***an animal's,*** *when you do it a kindness* ***that it understands*** (ibid., 112). The inhabitants of Arthurian kingdom were perceived as stubborn and deprived of reasoning capacity: *It was the stubborn unreasoning of the time* (ibid., 111); when Morgan describes them the lexeme *reason* is mainly used in the contexts with lexical or grammatical negation: *THEY have served other people so in their day; it being their own turn, now, they were not expecting any better treatment than this; so their philosophical bearing is not an outcome of mental training, intellectual fortitude,* ***reasoning****; it is mere animal training; they are white Indians* (ibid., 22).

This kind of discourse was deeply rooted in American history, and was firstly and successfully used against the Indians to justify their conquering and their further

investigation. Cass, an American politician and military officer, being the Secretary of War, assisted in implementing Jackson's policy of Indian removal through pushing them to modern Oklahoma in the 19th century. He stated the importance of myths to understand the causes and logic of Indian actions most naturally unwilling to flee from their homelands and understand the new civilization. Cass wanted to explain how they perceive the world and the only construct he could oppose to the Reason was Myth. He wrote:

Why was the Indian so childish and so impulsive? Why was he so resistant to change? Why did he seem never to employ reason? Cass attributed these defects in mentality to unknown, unsurmountable obstacles that made the Indian unbending in his habits and fantastic in his attitude to Life. Since Cass saw civilization as the product of reason, he concluded that the rejection of civilization was unreasonable. Was the Indian's mind so paralyzed that it could not reason and thus accept civilization, or was the rejection of civilization caused by something else? (Bieder 2003: 169).

The Arthurian kingdom is depicted as the land of myths and superstitions lacking laws of reason. In the second half of the 19th century the Indian question became pronounced in public debate. Twain tries to represent two different mental models of the narrative world opposed to each other – the unreason of the naïve citizens of the Arthurian kingdom with slow understanding and worshipping, mostly associated with the Enlightenment philosophy, to the reason of the Yankees, who are able to bring new changes in the society. The writer grants a nearly equal power to both of them in the context of the novel: *The worship of royalty being founded in unreason* (Twain 2008: 316). This concept of reason is personified by acting, informing, and guiding Hank Morgan in his deeds: *My **reason** straightway began to clamor; that was natural* (ibid., 17). The linguistic analysis of the novel shows that Reason is close to the author of the "Yankee...". It is the Reason with the capital letter that gives the inner impetus to Morgan's actions who reconstructs England in accordance with it: *I was the champion of hard unsentimental **common-sense and reason*** (ibid., 306). Notably, the concept of common sense appeared in American discourse together with other ideas of the Enlightenment, particularly from the Scottish one, and was fully incorporated in other

philosophical ideas. Kloppenberg digging into the fundamental ideas shaping liberalism argued: "The recent emphasis on the pervasiveness of Scottish common sense philosophy in the American Enlightenment has been as important as the recognition that natural law provided the screen on which Locke projected his political ideas" (1987: 17).

It appears in the contexts of criticizing the social order of monarchy, thus being in full accord with the pathos further added by Paine's interpretation of reason as an instrument of action. Thus, in the text of the novel, the adjective *reasonable* combines mainly with the action verbs – *do*, *act*, and *change*: *It is enough to make a body ashamed of his race to think of the sort of froth that has always occupied its thrones without **shadow of right or reason**, and the seventh-rate people that have always figured as its aristocracies – a company of monarchs and nobles who, as a rule, would have achieved only poverty and obscurity if left, like their betters, to their own exertions* (Twain 2008: 54). Obeying to monarchy is thus compared *to loyalty of unreason*.

Nevertheless, Twain feels that this undoubted belief in reason, coupled with progress, industrialization, will not lead to the moral improvement of mankind. The old Britain, no matter how improved it may be after the reforms of the Yankee, is still made up of real people with feelings and emotions. A human being is not only a MIND – machine-like CONTAINER with reason to analyze external impulses, but a more complicated whole.

The human mind is a complex conglomerate of ideas more or less systematically arranged. The inner self is viewed as an empire with a supreme ruler. Twain calls it "I" in the common language in the text, and it may correspond to *ego* in the philosophical language. Here he goes beyond mental capacities and amounts to viewing a human with his mind and soul combined. Twain, being not a pure theoretician, but a writer, who thought over and created vivid, living characters, went further in understanding

human nature by interpreting Hume's claims on the importance of emotions for human nature, or, maybe, returning to earlier philosophical ideas of the heart as a container for a human soul (Манерко 2017). He exploits the mechanism of projection into the created world of his narrative (Turner 1996) serving a tool for cognizing the human being in its full complexity.

Twain is concerned with the individual mind, thus probably implying that pure logical reasoning makes all humans virtually identical thinking objects. This, unfortunately, does not prevent them from mistakes arising from personal emotions and bodily experience. Building a human civilization rooted in the noble ideals of reason only and dismissing human emotions was a noble endeavour, yet a mistaken one. In a later generation of cognitive science and American philosophy (Prinz 2012), these ideas were summarized and tailored to embodied cognition and anthropocentric perspective in cognitive linguistics stating that human emotion and interpretation constitutes an essential part of our bodily experience.

Hank Morgan feels himself the root of the contradiction between reason and feeling, wisdom and morality, mind and heart. This is the precipice of a reductionist approach: "the Cartesian impulse to worship the brain and ignore the body" (Lehrer 2007: 19). This kind of character allows the author to oppose the reduction of the human thought processes to producing information and logical thinking as a reduction of the complicated real one: *My heart got to thumping. **You can't reason with your heart**; it has its own laws, and thumps about things which the intellect scorns* (Twain 2008: 348). This is a clear reminiscence to Pascal (1623-1662) – one more writer from the Enlightenment period who was opposing its framework and anticipated the protoexistential one. The original phrase runs as follows: "Le cœur a son ordre, l'esprit a le sien qui est par principe et demonstration" and translates as "The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know". It is used in the debates on whether faith is compatible with reason. Thus, reason and faith were considered equal in their capacity

of perceiving fundamentally different things – natural and divine, none being given preference. The same opposition yet verbalized differently is found in the final scene of the novel: *We have tried to put **reason** before **sentiment**, duty before love; our **minds** approve, but our **hearts** reproach us* (Twain 2008: 341).

Reason is tied to knowledge through thinking. Otherwise stated, knowledge is gained through reasoning as a process. The substantial quality of mental entities is reflected also in personification of knowledge. Knowledge is viewed as an inner issue, that is why it can inform, teach, or speak with its recipient: *I have mysterious **knowledge** which teaches me* (ibid., 180); *My **knowledge** informs me that* (ibid., 179). The text of the novel proves that the knowledge exists by itself. Yankee sees knowledge as power, yet it is useless unless embodied in action, deed, production, or social reform. All the words analyzed in the novel of Twain are presented in Fig. 7.

5.5 The reflection of HUMAN NATURE *in Twain's novel*

When Twain died, many newspapers summarized the significance of his writings in the following way: "How keen he was in his knowledge of human nature" (April 22, 1910, Hartford Courant) (Quirk 2005). Moreover, his writings "go to the very heart of human nature and sound the depths of its aspirations, aims, and hopes" (April 22, 1910, Los Angeles Times) (Quirk 2005). This interesting fact lends to a twofold interpretation within the context of the present paper that any thoughts on human nature finally lead to formulating a conception of what a human being is with his feelings and mental capacities taken together. And that was exactly the thing the philosophers of the Enlightenment tried to do first and the generations of succeeding centuries took to dig further. That is why it is critical to understand how these ideas sedimented in other types of discourse. "Twain's humor is what makes his own, more general thinking on human nature memorable and important" (Quirk 2005: 11).

At the same time, it was a word of the ordinary language and probably even a word most naturally applied by a writer portraying the life of his characters. Being a humorist author, Twain was professionally keen on noticing funny things in humans. On the other hand, it evokes a noble tradition of studying human nature in philosophy of the previous period. For example, the collocation *human nature* appeared on the basis of a terminological sense in Hume's "A treatise of human nature".

Several competing or contradictory explanations of human nature (what the human creature is and how it came to be that way) coexisted, somewhat uneasily, in the 19th century mind. Various attempts were formulated to explain it through various positions ranging from a stable resilient nature to the volatile one. Spencer, whom Twain was supposed to have read, stressed:

The difficulty of understanding that human nature, though indefinitely modifiable, can be modified but very slowly; and that all laws and institutions and appliances which count on getting from it, within a short time, much better results than present ones, will inevitably fail (1972: 110).

In the novel, we also find several peculiar examples of Morgan talking about human nature in the context of thinking about church and the possibility to change the minds through changing the religion worldview into *Presbyterian*. However, Morgan understands that human nature is rather resistant to changes, and its laws are so powerful that breaking them at once is nearly impossible: *but that would have been to affront a law of **human nature*** (Twain 2008: 69). Morgan exploits his understanding of what makes the inhabitants of Arthurian kingdom human – they believe in miracles and do not want to alter them into solid knowledge. Thus, in the duel with Merlin, Morgan acknowledges: *I know the value of these things, **for I know human nature.** You can't throw too much style into a miracle. It costs trouble, and work, and sometimes money; but it pays in the end* (ibid., 172).

This skeptical misanthropic vision proceeds nearly by the end of the story. Morgan explains illogical actions simply saying that the reason is human nature far from being ideal: *It was some **more human nature**; the admiring little folk imitating their elders* (ibid., 242). Moreover, he can observe it in himself as well: *I was beginning to have a base hankering to be its first president myself. Yes, there was more or less **human nature in me; I found that out*** (ibid., 131). Still, there is a possibility of training and changing the human nature as Yankee thinks contradicting himself earlier. *Training – training is everything; training is all there is TO a person. We speak of nature; it is folly; there is **no such thing as nature**; what we call by that misleading name is merely heredity and training. **We have no thoughts of our own, no opinions of our own; they are transmitted to us, trained into us*** (ibid., 127).

This is in clear correlation with Twain's idea in his essay entitled "What is man?", in which he was still talking about the diversity of people comparing them to various precious metals like gold, silver, and iron. The old man talking seriously to a young man in the form of a dialogue explains: *That it shows the value of **training** in right directions over training in wrong ones. Inestimably valuable is training, influence, education, in right directions – training one's self-approbation to elevate its ideals* (Clements 1973: 130). The latter might have derived from Locke viewing nature as empty from the very beginning and filled with influences onwards.

The importance of education and training verbalized in Twain's works was also 'transmitted' from cultural surrounding of the period as the Americans of the 18th century vigorously embraced the idea that only education and cultivation separated one man from another inherently equal and made it politically important. For Morgan, "civilization" involves *training a crowd of ignorant folks into experts*, changing their minds. The latter he aimed to perform with his own schools, and publishing a paper seems as a great tool of propaganda.

The Enlightened vision of reality was reflected in it: "In no other country on earth, not even in Great Britain are Newspapers so generally circulated among the body of the people, as in America" (Wood 2006: 166). People were hungry for knowledge:

by 1810 Americans were buying over 22 million copies of 376 newspapers annually – even though half the population was under the age of sixteen and one-fifth was enslaved and prevented from reading. This was the largest aggregate circulation of newspapers of any country in the world (ibid., 166).

As "The corpus of historical American English" shows, the collocation *human nature* experienced a steady rise from the 1840s up to 1910 (Fig. 8), when the philosophical ideas got fully assimilated by the general public. It is noteworthy, that this proverbially vague notion – a human nature – could be represented as some theory of the human being in the complexity of its biological, mental, and social aspects. This complexity was widely discussed by the intellectual spectrum in America. In 1899, Channing called special attention to this notion and placed it to the core of all possible speculations. He states, "All our inquiries in morals, religion, and politics must begin with human nature" ("The principles of moral, religious, and political science", included in William H. Channing). The mental aspect of the human nature was considered to be of utmost importance and even as the fundamental feature defining the human being as such. Nevertheless, as we see, Twain's work represented and transformed the philosophical ideas already circulating in the intellectual life of America and expressed his own warnings coming from mechanistic rational view of a human being. Twain points:

It is not worthwhile to try to keep history from repeating itself: for man's character will always make the preventing of the repetitions impossible. Whenever man makes a large stride in material prosperity and progress he is sure to think that he has progresses whereas he has not advanced an inch; nothing has progressed but his circumstances. He stands where he stood before. He knows more than his forebears knew but his intellect is no better than theirs and never will be (Voto 1940: 66).

**The frequency of use of *human nature* in CHAE**

Figure 8. The frequency of use of *human nature* in the corpus
of historical American English (CHAE)

This profound knowledge of human nature and an undogmatic attitude towards philosophy allowed Twain to foresee the possible crisis in future. Thus, the humorous experiment had the seeds of the real problems to grow. The problems lied partially in the uncritical attitude to reason, nearly making it a religious belief. And the reference to Pascal about the importance of human heart in opposition to reason used only once in the text becomes a very powerful statement allowing Twain to make fun of the supremacy of reason, not to make it absolute. Twain wrote down in his notebook: "Have a battle between a modern army, with gatling guns – (automatic) 600 shots a minute, with one pulling of the trigger, torpedoes, balloons, 100-ton cannon, iron-clad fleet..." (Twain 2008: ix). One more citing from his diary proves the ongoing complication of the ideas, emerging in the text:

He mourns his lost land – has come to England and revisited it, but it is all changed and become old, so old – and it was so fresh and new, so virgin before. Winchester does not resemble Camelot, and the Round Table... is not true one. Has lost all interest in life – is found dead next morning – suicide (Twain 2008: ix).

The sharp contrast between the hilarious beginning of the book and the tragic ending was the reason why the novel was criticized and even considered a failure as "earlier critics probably regarded the horrific ending either as a type of tall-tale exaggeration or as the hyperbole of the adventure story genre itself" (Baetzhold 2013: 178). This is an ending in which "the novel depicts its hero's "progress" as a circular or gnostic experience, showing how every step he takes ostensibly in the name of the Enlightenment merely hastens the beginning" (Morris 2009: 165).

6. Concluding remarks: From Enlightenment philosophy to reshaping Twain's discourse

The present study aimed at revealing the possible stages the ideas of the Enlightenment moved through by navigating various types of discourse. Starting with the philosophical professional essays, the ideas proceeded then to public and political treatises and, at last, to fiction, each decreasing the complexity and increasing the metaphoric load as well as evaluation of the ideas. More than a century passed for the ideas to find their way from philosophically minded circles to the minds of ordinary people with their complete assimilation, adaptation to well-defined social and political needs, and, to a certain extent, simplification.

The conceptions on how the human mind works and what constitutes human consciousness became an indispensable part of the legacy of the Enlightenment period. The conceptions are prominent in common knowledge not in the form of direct or indirect citations, but as semiotically meaningful and typical ways of thinking, reasoning, and discourse construal.

Through a kind of reversed engineering procedure (going from the result to the origin) and having analyzed the linguistic structures of key terms of the mental sphere including *mind, consciousness, understanding*, and *reason*, we made an attempt to penetrate into the etymology of the studied lexemes, we also paid attention to their

linguistic context and showed specific features of their lingual expression and the cognitive structures associated with these conceptual entities in human thinking. To fulfil our aim, we applied the method of image schematic analysis to the works chosen for the purpose of the linguistic analysis in our research. The latter implies that image schemas organize our experience and ground meaning and its development. In each case we provided the quantitative analysis of all the schemas and conceptual metaphors characterizing the discourse of a particular author.

Therefore, the study comprised 3 stages: the cognitive linguistic analysis through the study of image schemas in the works of two eminent philosophers – Locke and Hume, which was further employed in the texts of philosophical insights of Paine. Finally, the representative text of Twain's novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" was subjected to a similar linguistic and cognitive analysis in combination with socio-cultural comment as well as the reference to his other texts where necessary.

The philosophical works we scrutinized revealed that all the discourse material is to be structured according to several major schemas. In Locke's "*An essay concerning human understanding*", the most frequent schemas in depicting the human mind are MIND AS A CONTAINER, MIND AS A PERSON, and MIND AS A SURFACE. In Hume's *"A treatise of human nature"*, the conceptual entities of a CONTAINER, PERSON, MACHINE, OBJECT, and WHOLE-PART relations are illuminated. The CONTAINER is the most prominent schema for both Locke and Hume probably due to the centrality of space for human perception. There are numerous instances in the works of British philosophers when the investigated words are viewed as a separate world having the reflections or 'mental' copies of real things with the inner space profiled rather than the outer, yet the container can extend its bounding surface, embracing new things for consideration. The conceptual metaphors in the form of extended ones at the discourse level are used in full accord with the dominating image schema. Thus, the image schema of a CONTAINER was realized through the metaphors of a theatre, machine, the world, and

the drawer. These metaphors in contrast to image schemas are not universal but culture specific, revealing the difference between the two philosophers and the periods of writing. Thus, the metaphor of the cabinet and a mirror in case of Locke is succeeded by a chamber within some machine in Hume's works, and further with a church for representing mind and reason in Paine.

The famous Locke's metaphor of 'tabula rasa' is not a sheet of paper, but an empty cabinet with numerous inner minor containers filled with the categorized entities. Since Locke's work is grounded around understanding of the human individuality, he essentially personalizes mind and other cognitive functions. Yet, the mind is viewed as a container where new experience, sensations, and ideas get into and are further transformed. Locke clearly understood the difficulty to penetrate into human understanding and at the same time the semiotic duality of mind viewed as a container for impressions gathered from the outer world, thus becoming reflections or shadows of real things. Reason is seen as light-emitting – the influential metaphor to become over-arching for the whole period of Enlightenment.

Cognitive mechanisms directing human thought in information processing and naming according to the aims of communication greatly depend on the set of categorization and conceptualization mechanisms representing semantic, semiotic, onomasiological, and syntactical characteristics. In analyzing Hume's works, we revealed that understanding mind significantly shifted towards MACHINE we outlined in a separate category, although it has the features of the general CONTAINER schema. The reason serves as a SOURCE for other thoughts and ideas. Besides that, he created several metaphors, very influential in the history of Western philosophical thought: mind as a heap of perceptions, soul as a republic or commonwealth, mind as a theater. Here several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. Reason is given a more

prominent, philosophical interpretation in Hume's treatises and is personified through images of a judge or queen.

Paine was among the first authors who transformed the philosophical complex ideas into politically charged interpretations bringing reason among other notions to the fore. Not changing essentially the distribution of image schemas and borrowing deeply from the philosophical works, he interpreted the major concepts with greater simplicity and several original metaphors. With the anticlerical pathos, he made *mind* his church and reason – the supreme rule and governor of all actions.

Twain was a well-read and highly intelligent writer serving as a 'transmitter' of more complex ideas of the Enlightenment through his fiction. Probably grounded in his interest in the humorous aspect of human personality, his discourse led him to deeper insights into human nature, partially dating back to the diverse philosophical background. Morgan mainly verbalizes the set of Enlightenment ideas about human nature and advocates a high position of reason among other cognitive functions of a person. Yet, at the same time he serves as an example foreseeing the negative outcome of believing in reason purely and solely.

Notably, this novel also allowed to incorporate the technological and scientific domains into the Arthurian myth being important for further interpretations of the 20th century and establishing the possible blend of archaic or medieval culture and the contemporary one based on Enlightenment. This sort of historical and linguistic endeavour provides valuable insights on how mind, consciousness, and other related mental entities have been conceptualized throughout time, thus revealing a lot about what makes us human beings. This pertains to elucidating the basic cognitive mechanisms of conceptualizing, categorizing, interpreting, and re-categorizing the world as well as assigning meaning to its phenomena and transferring it through signs of language and culture.

Abbreviations

AHDEL – The American heritage dictionary of the English language

CHAE – Corpus of Historical American English

MED – Middle English dictionary

OED − Oxford English dictionary

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Contact data		Fields of interest
Anastasia Sharapkova CSc. (Philology), Lecturer at English Linguistics Department, Faculty of Philology, Senior Researcher at Analytical Department, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 51, Leninskie gory 1, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation e-mail: warapkova@mail.ru		Arthurian studies, cognitive linguistics, mythology, lexicology.
Evgeny Loginov CSc. (Philosophy), Junior Researcher at Department of History of Foreign Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 27, Lomonosovsky ave., 4, 11991, Moscow, Russian Federation e-mail: loginovlosmar@gmail.com		Ch.S. Peirce and history of pragmatism, analytic philosophy, personal identity, metaphysics.
Larissa Manerko, DSc. (Philology), Professor Head of the Chair of the Theory and practice of the English language, Higher School of Translation and Interpretation, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Leninskie Gory, 1, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation e-mail: wordfnew@mail.ru		Lexicology and history of the English language, linguistic theories and history of linguistics, cognitive linguistics, terminology and LSP, professional discourse.

Résumé

Human mind and the mechanisms it works by have challenged scholars for centuries. The most profound attempts to elaborate on the human mind were made in the works of the greatest European intellectuals of the Enlightenment – Locke and Hume. The impact of their philosophical ideas was so huge that they influenced profoundly the American public discourse and ideology, especially Thomas Paine. Paine further transformed his thoughts to broad public, thus influencing the American citizens' way of thinking, their democratic and anti-authoritarian spirit. Embracing the major constructs of these authors, the key concepts MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS, UNDERSTANDING, and REASON are revealed. These conceptual entities are explicated on the basis of linguistic and conceptual analysis including conceptual metaphors and image schemas as a part of discourse analysis. The list of conceptual metaphors and image schemas is various: in Locke's principal work "An essay concerning human understanding" and Hume's "A treatise of human nature", the fundamental role of the category of space in human psychological and mental sphere of MIND is explicated through its comparison with the CONTAINER, PERSON and MACHINE and other metaphors. *Consciousness* refers to the general picture characterizing the personal identity and *reason* is closely connected with understanding. In Paine's papers all the key words appear to be closely intersected with mind. The line of influence is further observed in Mark Twain's works including the fictional novels. The linguistic and cognitive analysis of Twain's discourse in the novel "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's court" shows that the author adopted many of the philosophical ideas of the British and American philosophy concerning human experience and knowledge interpretation. A closer look at the linguistic and conceptual patterns of discourse of Twain and the ideas verbalized by Morgan, being the protagonist in the novel, reveal the succession of influences of the Enlightenment upon the personality of the writer and his philosophical background in individual way of expressing his thoughts. Furthermore, we demonstrate that it was the preoccupation with reason and knowledge that was used in opposition to the Arthurian

England and all kinds of myths and superstitions. Twain's writings not only transmitted the ideas further, but also uncovered the potential crisis in overinterpreting them.