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THE *will* AND *be going to* CONSTRUCTIONS AS PANCHRONIC INFERENCES: IN SEARCH OF COGNITIVE MOTIVATION

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Abstract: The two major expressions of futurity in English, the *will* and *be going to* constructions, are examined in terms of panchrony and equivalentization, both discussed in the context of grammaticalization. The search of futurity is motivated by a cognitive account of language as a means of representing the conventional conceptual structure. The generalizations are made as regards the panchronic schemata, and the findings are evidenced with both selected historical and present-day language material.

Keywords: *be-going-to* future vs. *will* future, panchrony, equivalentization, grammaticalization, conceptualization, cognitive linguistics.

1. Introduction

The most immediate objective of the present study is to give a historically- and cognitively-motivated reading to the linguistic status of the *will* and *be going to* constructions as two major expressions of futurity in English. Traditionally, in theory and practice, the *will* and *be going to* constructions (as time markers, that is) are usually attempted to be defined in terms of the volition-prediction contrast, with volition as

another term for intention. In order to evidence that, we begin with a brief overview of how the two constructions are presented in the sources that, for usage-based purposes, aim at making the distinction clear. Along with that, we report on the research of a more theoretical kind, corpus studies inclusively. Dissatisfied with the findings, we start searching, in the following parts, for an alternative solution to the intention/volition-prediction considerations. Part 2 is, then, dedicated to sketching the linguistic background for our historical, cognitive, and material reflections in respective Parts 3, 4, and 5.

Based on the assumption that the linguistic theoretical tenets project usage-based applications, a brief scrutiny follows on how the *will* and *to be going to* constructions happen to be differentiated in some of the handbooks. For example, in the *English file*, *Speakout*, *New headway*, and *Interchange* series, the futurity import of *be going to* is presented in terms of plans and predictions, the former being at times coupled with the notions of intentions and decisions. The futurity use of the *will* construction, in turn, seems to be apprehended in different terms in different sources: in the *English file* series it is presented as promises, offers, and decisions at the pre-intermediate level (Unit 6) (Latham-Koenig et al. 2013: 136), which is made more specific as instant decisions, promises, offers, predictions, future facts, and suggestions at the intermediate level (Unit 1) (Latham-Koenig & Oxenden 2013: 133). In the *Speakout* series, *will* is said to be used for future prediction purposes at the pre-intermediate level (Unit 6) (Clare & Wilson 2016b: 138), this being supplemented at the intermediate level with a note on *will* having to do with plans: "when there is no plan or arrangement (when we make a decision at the time of speaking)" (Unit 3) (Clare & Wilson 2016a: 132). In *Interchange – Book 2* (Unit 5) (Richards et al. 2013a: 31), *will* is contrasted with *be going to* by means of "plans before you've made a decision" (*will*) and "plans you've decided on" (*be going to*), whereas the predictive power of *will* is discussed as late as *Interchange – Book 3* (Unit 10) (Richards et al. 2013b: 67). *New headway – Intermediate* (Unit 8) appears to offer most explanations on *will*, saying, among other things, that it "expresses a future fact or prediction", with "a prediction [...] based more

on an opinion than a fact", as well as it "is used to express a decision, intention, or offer made at the moment of speaking" (Soars et al. 2019: 149).

In a more or less elaborate fashion, the ensuing implications suggest that both *will* (as a modal) and *be going to* (as a semi-modal, a phrasal auxiliary (Greenbaum & Nelson 2002), a verb phrase (Herring 2016), a futurish auxiliary (Declerck 2006: 340), or a grammaticalized modal phrase (Carter & McCarthy 2006)) may have two main senses. One of these has to do with an intrinsic/epistemic meaning (volition, intention), whereas the other one with extrinsic/deontic one (prediction). The examples we quote after Biber et al. (1999: 496, 501) below illustrate these two semantic options:

(1)

(a) *I **won't** be here early enough to show you before school.* [intrinsic, (personal) volition]

(b) *It **won't** be that difficult to do.* [extrinsic, prediction]

(2)

(a) *I'm **going to** put my feet up and rest.* [intrinsic, (personal) volition]

(b) *Because you're **going to** have to say something.* [extrinsic, prediction]

Although in their volume, Biber et al. (ibid.) do not label any single instance of *be going to* as being used extrinsically, the sentence we quote in Example 2b corresponds closely enough to their argumentation for it to have an extrinsic import. This lack of overt exemplification in Biber et al. might be attributed to the fact that, as they say, "*be going to* is particularly common in marking volition but less commonly used to mark prediction" (ibid., 495). Still, we take that to be a reason to question the volition-prediction distinction altogether.

Indeed, there seem to be good reasons why the volition-prediction contrast may not be employed. For one, as Biber et al. admit, the distinction between volition and prediction

"is often blurred" (1999: 496), or "is often ambiguous" (ibid., 1135). What their Figure 6.14 (ibid., 496) shows is that the ambiguous examples of the conversational *will* outnumber almost by 4 times either the volition or prediction ones, which, at least for the modal *will* in conversation, deprives this parameter most of its distinctive power. To quote their statistics per one million words, while the frequency of the ambiguous *will* amounts to more than 3500 occurrences, for the unambiguous prediction and volition examples, respectively, it does not exceed 1000 occurrences. Simply, the kind of *will* that is expected in conversational English blurs the boundaries between volition and prediction so much and so often that *will* is likely to be ambiguous in 70% of its conversational usage.

The volition-prediction distinction does tell apart the volitive and the predictive *will* nicely in academic discourse, but this time the ratio is 1:25, such an overwhelmingly one-sided bias that, however descriptively interesting, it does not explain much. Per one million words, the 2500 prediction occurrences can be balanced with mere 100-150 volition occurrences, which makes *will* nearly unequivocally predictive. In the case of the academic applications of *be going to*, there can be observed an indiscriminate fifty-fifty situation with such an exceptionally small number of examples attested per million words that generalizations cannot really be offered. If at all, the volition-prediction calibration may be found operative for the conversational *be going to*, with an insignificant number of ambiguous cases. More specifically, 1500 occurrences of the volitive and 750 occurrences of the predictive kinds of *be going to* can be found per one million words. (See Fig. 6.14 (ibid., 496) for all the relevant statistics)

It is not mere ambiguity in application that appears to be difficult to follow, but also the alleged interchangeability of *will* and *be going to* as used to make future references. As Declerck sees it,

"*be going to* parallels *will* (as future tense auxiliary), which simply expresses future time reference [...]. The only difference is that *be going to* is less grammaticalized as a marker of future tense than *will* is, since it is more frequently found with predominantly present time reference" (2006: 107).

On a close reading, however, this "only difference" between the two can be claimed merely because Declerck assumes that *be going to* has "double time reference" (2006: 106-108), one being "futurish" and the other one being "future time", and that it is the latter that counts here as a match for, or a parallel to, the future tense auxiliary *will*. This we illustrate below (3) with Declerck's examples (ibid., 107):

(3)

(a) *I'm going to pick the lock.*

(b) *Tomorrow the weather's going to be better than it's been today.*

As Declerck explains, the first application of *be going to* "has to do with present factors, such as present intention", whereas the other one "is simply future time reference" (2006: 107).

Nevertheless, let us for a while experiment a little on Declerck's examples and swap the real-world "factors" (see 3a and 3b), which is what we expect is all that makes the difference between them. What we obtain is below (4):

(4)

(a) *Tomorrow I'm going to pick the lock as I've got no time to do it today.*

(b) *The weather's going to be better.*

What would we say *now*? To follow Declerck's future-futurish distinction, Example 4a must be labelled future time (as much as Example 3b is), while Example 4b must be futurish (by analogy to Example 3a). We cannot evaluate the two sentences in Example 4 the other way round because, first, that would violate Declerck's "present factors, such as present intention" (2006: 107), which is what he on principle ascribes to the futurish, and, second, that would ignore the *tomorrow-today* contrast (see 3b and 4a) that points clearly to the future time, as understood and championed by Declerck. So,

the whole future-futurish distinction seems to depend here on the actual use/no-use of adverbials as a source of evidence,¹ and this is too little to tell apart *be going to* used, respectively, in a future-like reference (futurish) and in future time reference (future tense).²

Most of the dilemmas we have identified so far in selected handbooks and grammars are discussed in detailed linguistic investigations as well, no matter whether they are questionnaire- or corpus-based. For example, in his cross-linguistic study, Dahl (1985: 110) comes to the conclusion that "both *shall*, *will*, and *be going to* [are] alternative future auxiliaries [which] normally (...) differ in more or less subtle ways in their semantics". Nevertheless, however subtle these nuances can be, it is only the *will* construction that, according to him, "can be subsumed under FUT[URE]", with the *be going to* construction falling into the PROSP(ECTIVE) category, by analogy to "the French *aller* + infinitive, and (...) Afrikaans *gaan* + infinitive" (ibid., 112).

This is not to say that Dahl questions future time references of *be going to*, as he takes it to be one of "more marginal future signaling categories" (ibid., 189), a conclusion that may well echo systemic (mainly morphological and tense-aspect) considerations, but does not reflect the cognitive reality behind *be going to*. If it did, Dahl would need to assign *be going to* to the characteristics he identifies for his FUT(URE), the English *will* construction included, such as "actions that are planned by the agent of the sentence", "'intention' [as] part of the prototype", "'predictions' (...) as a secondary use of FUT[URE] categories" and, most generally, "'future time reference'" (ibid., 105-106, 108). In short, the semantic prototype he ascribes to FUT(URE), "involving at least the three features 'intention', 'prediction', and 'future time reference'" (ibid., 108), can also match the *be going to* construction which he sidetracks, to repeat, as a future signaling category of a minor status.

In Dahl (2000a), the starting point is, again, the intention-based *versus* prediction-based future time references, the former "restricted to things that are under our [human]

control" and the latter concerning "courses of events that are not within human control or at least not within the control of the speaker" (ibid., 309). Yet, as Dahl's Example 3 (ibid., 310) shows, the distinction is far from clear-cut. As he believes, all the 4 instances of the *will* construction in the weather forecast he quotes pertain unambiguously to prediction, instead of intention. After all, one could say, the forecaster has got to say what the weather is predicted to be. Technically speaking, however, this poses a problem in the light of the so-called evidential function of futurity expressions. Disney (2009) illustrates it with a contrast between *It is going to be a beautiful day tomorrow* vis-à-vis *It will be a beautiful day tomorrow*, and comments as follows: "a speaker is likely to use [the former] when they have clear evidence (...), and [the latter] when they are expressing a belief or opinion" (ibid., 63). As the weatherperson's job is to anticipate the most probable course of events, the desirable futurity construction is *be going to*, whereas, paradoxically enough, it is *will* that is used. The explanation Dahl offers for this mismatch reflects the historical path of *will*, and related expressions in other languages, from "originally restricted to intention-based future (...) into general future markers", which means that although prediction-based future cases are central in *will*, "[*will*] can in the normal case still be used for intention-based [future]" (2000a: 310). In this way, as employed in weather forecasts, the *will* construction reveals its prediction (central) applications without a trace of its original intention import.

Still, what kind futurity do weather forecasts really project? What the weatherperson offers is a prediction, as we all would like to take it, or an expectation, as it very often turns out to be? The difference may be subtle, but it is crucial, since while expectation builds on beliefs and intentions, and, thus, invites subjectivity and making assumptions, prediction resides in knowledge, and, thus, sides with objectivity and exploring evidence. This accords with how the verbs *expect* and *predict* are typically defined, the former being explicated with thinking and/or believing that something will happen and the latter with saying that something will happen (cf. the two entries in *CALD*, *CED*, *LDCE*, *MED*). Likewise, while *prediction* is "a statement about what you think will

happen" (*CALD* and *MED*), *expectations* are "your strong hopes or beliefs that something will happen or that you will get something that you want" (*CED*) or "what you believe or hope will happen" (*CALD*). So, in the last source, with the *will* construction used, the weather forecast is not that which is said/known to happen but that which is believed/hoped/wished to happen.

This reflects the popular wisdom that weather forecast is not always right and that it has more to do with wishful thinking, or (fore)casting a spell, or, literally, a prophecy (cf. *forecast* as a noun in *MWD-online*), rather than with making estimations. In the light of what we argue for in relation to the data presented in Examples (10-19) below, it seems only natural, semantically and pragmatically, to make use of the *will* construction to project futurity in weather forecasts. Unlike the *be going to* construction, the *will* futurity helps avoid implying that the evidence of forecasting is, in fact, supposed to be objective, in the sense: knowledge-based, which makes the forecast tentative and facilitates, should that be the case, saving face. Consider Neale's (1985: 3) reflection: "The forecaster must make a choice. This amounts to gambling, with the forecaster staking his or her reputation on the choice made". Nevertheless, the disillusion of poor weather forecast would be far more tangible if it were given in terms of *be going to* than when it is stated in terms of *will*. To sum up, in weather forecasts, evidential considerations appear to be overridden with pragmatic factors, with *will* unlocking its historically original senses of intention/volition, rather than its secondary (extended) senses of prediction.

The fact that pragmatics, with its contextual and subjective factors, may blur the otherwise clear-cut distinction between prediction and intention, comes with Budts' (2014) corpus-based research on the *be going to* construction from 1710 to 1920. Budts starts her analysis when *be going to* has already grammaticalized, that is, it has stopped expressing motion with purpose and started expressing intention. At this stage (the 18th century), Budts identifies the process of subjectification (after Traugott 1989) operating in *be going to* and

"(...) involving a shift of focus from the intention of the grammatical subject to the attitude of the speaker: what matters is no longer the intention of the subject, but the extent to which the speaker has knowledge of the intentions of the subject. (...) It involves an increase in the involvement of the speaker, who no longer merely describes his own or someone else's intentions, but actively conjectures these intentions on the basis of contextually available clues" (2014: 60).

In other words, whenever the evidence or knowledge of speakers is incomplete or insufficient to comment on the intentions of others in a reliable and coherent fashion, speakers, in fact, express their own subjective opinions as regards a given situation. Budts calls that a "tension between knowing and reporting", which, as she says, "naturally led to the pragmatic inference of prediction which eventually became conventionalized and encoded in the meaning of *be going to* itself" (ibid., 60). Without going into technicalities, the lesson we derive from Budts' research (as well as from our brief appraisal of Dahl (1985, 2000) above) is that the development of the English futurity expressions has been fueled not so much by language-internal systemic considerations, but by the speaker's contextualized experience of the world.

To conclude our introductory remarks, instead of the intention/volition-prediction distinction some other parameter(s) should be defined in order to discriminate the futures behind the *will* and *be going to* constructions. Our proposal is glossed as Panchronic Schemata 1 and 2, motivated cognitively, attested panchronically, and justified by present-day usage. In practice, this amounts to presenting the two constructions in terms of the future-oriented experiential inferences they have come to express, that is, respectively, desire and determination (*will*) *vis-a-vis* directed purpose and on-going activity (*be going to*).

2. Motivating futurity: From experience to language

Operationally, what we refer here to as **panchrony** is Filar and Łozowski's (2019: 82) supposition that the linguistic means we have at our disposal, including the ways we express futurity, are a product of cross-generational experiential inferences. Aware of that or not, we use the expressions that the communities we belong to have come to represent the way they think, imagine, reason, or conceptualize. What can be

recognized in language as panchronic comes from treating language as a cognitive tool of categorization, or from placing language change in the context of the evolution of human understanding, or – still better – from seeing language categories as ever-evolving derivatives of cognitive tensions. The very presence of cognitive factors in diachronic description is precisely the reason why instead of a linear succession of discrete language states in space and time (which is a broad definition of diachrony) we obtain a multi-directional progression of non-discrete categorization processes in language (which might be a working definition of panchrony). Unlike in diachrony, in panchrony language no longer functions in space and time, but it operates in human understanding of space and time.

The interpretation of panchrony given in the preceding paragraph is specifically based on Łozowski (1999, 2008) and happens to be referred to recently in Kiełtyka (2020). As it stands, it does correspond to Bybee's "mechanisms of change that propel the constant creation and re-creation of grammar" (2006: 180), or "formational mechanisms that bring linguistic structure into being [...], mechanisms behind the linguistic changes that create grammatical and phonological systems" (ibid., 194). Yet, while Bybee takes panchrony to be "an integrated whole" (2010: 105), with synchrony and diachrony playing their respective parts, we find it independent of the synchrony-diachrony considerations and, thus, constituting a set of cognitive inferences and conceptualizations expressed in language.

If we were to make a little detour for the purposes of illustrating panchrony, take the on-going public discourse on the future wherever and whenever that proves relevant. In multi-lingual contexts, be it world-wide, continental, or national, this discussion is voiced in different languages, each having its own ways of expressing futurity, and finds its embodiment in the corresponding texts translated and disseminated. Roughly speaking, there can be as many "futures" as there are languages used to express the conceptual images of futurity that have been encoded in these languages. Naturally, what one finds in respective expressions of futurity in respective languages is simply

linguistic externalizations (verbalizations) of the world-view(s) that respective social groups have developed in their cross-generational collective experience.³

Thus, if debating futurity proves to be difficult, if at all conclusive, this is not because the notion of future is not something that cannot be rendered from one language to another, but because the conceptualizations encoded in them stem from different experiential inferences and reflect different mentalities. This is, then, like narrating different film adaptations of one and the same fairy tale – the story-line and the characters look familiar, but the depiction and, thus, perception may be worlds apart.

Let us take one example, which is the two final sentences from "White paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025" (2017) in selected languages:

(5)

(a) Eng. *It is our collective will that **will drive** Europe **forward**. Like the generations before us, we have Europe's future in our own hands.*

(b) Ger. *Nur unser kollektiver Wille **wird** Europa **voranbringen**. Ebenso wie die Generationen vor uns haben auch wir die Zukunft Europas selbst in der Hand.*

(c) Sp. *Es nuestra voluntad colectiva la que **hará avanzar** Europa. Al igual que las generaciones que nos han precedido, tenemos en nuestras manos el futuro de Europa.*

(d) Fr. *C'est notre volonté collective qui **fera avancer** l'Europe. À l'instar des générations qui nous ont pré.*

(e) Ital. *Sarà la nostra volontà collettiva che **consentirà** all'Europa di **andare avanti**. Come per le generazioni che ci hanno preceduto, il futuro dell'Europa è nelle nostre mani.*

All of these translations are accurate, serve the purposes of surface communication, and can hardly be better in terms of translation skills. However, what makes them incompatible with each other is that, in addition to different grammatical systems with

differing richness of inflectional (i.e. synthetic) marking of tense distinctions, they express different experiential/cognitive/cultural overtones that have been being accumulated in them by their respective societies/communities. In other words, when the speakers of English say *will* (5a), of German *wird* (5b), of Spanish *hará* (5c), of French *fera* (5d), or of Italian *consentirà* (5e), they certainly make a reference to future, but each of them project different kinds of future because the expressions they use have over the centuries been encoded with different aspects of their (collective) experience.

Now, the panchronic experiential load behind the present-day expressions of futurity correspond closely to the change known as grammaticalization: original lexical items have turned into grammatical markers. In this sense, *will*, *wird*, *hará*, and *fera*, *consentirà* in the examples just quoted (5) do not mean what they say ('desire', 'become', 'do', 'make', 'allow'), but serve to signal future time references, that is, they are auxiliary, or auxiliary-like, to help express grammatical functions, and not lexical meanings.

This brings us to the other focal theoretical notion here – **equivalentization**, which we take to be an all-embracing property of the mind, capturing the human capacity to express coherent world judgements by means of lexical resources and grammatical resources, the two contracting various relations with each other (cf. Filar and Łozowski 2019: 73-74). For some reasons, language users find it necessary and useful not only to manifest and represent their conceptualizations in grammatical constructions and in lexical units, but also to re-conceptualize the conceptual content of either of the two for one to become the other. In this sense, lexicon is an equivalent of grammar, and grammar is an equivalent of lexicon, both relating to each other on the continuum basis (cf. Łozowski 2019). As Langacker (2008: 161) would put it, "grammar and lexicon form a continuum fully reducible to assemblies of symbolic structures", with no clear-cut transition from one to the other. If so, equivalentization has to do with some propensity and predilection of the human mind to search for, identify, and bring together the "symbolic structures" available in language for their conceptual content to

be given a better, or a more adequate, expression of the underlying mentalities. However diverse in their lexical-and/or-grammatical status, various elements of the language we speak undergo the process of symbolization, or externalization, of our ways of thinking about ourselves and our world(s).

In this sense, language is not, as in structurally-oriented linguistics, "a system of which all the parts can and must be considered as synchronically interdependent" (Saussure 1983: 86), but, to use Langacker's terms again, an "assembly" (2008: 507), or an "inventory" (ibid., 221-222), of symbols of human cognition. This makes the *will* as well as the *be going to* constructions symbolic expressions of how futurity, otherwise intangible and unattainable (to quote Dahl (1985: 103), "we cannot perceive the future directly or 'remember' it"), has over the centuries been given its symbolic linguistic representation in/by the English-speaking communities.

As both panchrony and equivalentization result in grammaticalization, it may be relevant to explain how the three relate to each other. The correspondence seems to be this: in their cross-generational search of giving linguistic expression to experience-driven conceptualizations (panchrony), language users come to see that the lexical resources they have at their disposal may as well serve grammatical functions (equivalentization). The net effect of these two endeavors of human cognition is a language change consisting in, to give Kuryłowicz' (1965: 52) wording, "the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status" (grammaticalization), thus allowing for a complete or partial "bleaching" of the source (lexical) semantics and, parallel to that, a complete or partial "coloring" of the target (grammatical) functions. In her most recent research, Kleineberg (2022: 206) identifies grammaticalization with "the change of Lat. *mēns* 'reason' and Germanic *lika* 'body' to the adverbial markers of Romance – *ment(e)* and English *-ly*", respectively. Yet, she does not comment on which of the two options that Kuryłowicz mentions these changes could represent, whereas once we want to see grammaticalization effects as consequences of cross-generational cognitive

inferences, it makes sense to get to know to what extent human experience has disentangled the lexical and the grammatical, or how the two relate to, or overlap with, each other.

In our case, of Kuryłowicz' two options, the *will* and the *be going to* constructions no doubt illustrate the first one – in the history of English, they have indeed advanced from purely lexical expressions of 'go' and 'want' to grammatical markers of futurity. Yet, as envisaged by Kuryłowicz, they may as well be still advancing in their present grammatical status towards absolutely purely and exclusively grammatical functions without invoking any lexical residual whatsoever. This does not seem to be the case as yet because both *go* and *will* do function outside their respective futurity constructions, for which see Examples 16-19 (*will*) below and the literal meaning of *go* in, for example, *I'm going upstairs to read a book*. If we, then, allow for the grammaticalization process still advancing towards further and, possibly, ultimate bleaching of the original lexical attributes of 'go' and 'want', we need to be prepared to modify our Panchronic Schemata 1 and 2 below, proportionately to how the grammatical feeds on the lexical. If, as assumed in cognitive linguistics, "grammar has no autonomous existence" (Langacker 2017: 77), all that we can learn about the origin and development of grammatical constructions comes from understanding the lexical-*versus*-grammatical tug-of-war in the process of grammaticalization, and this is facilitated by cognitive inferences that are handed down in a cross-generational perspective.

Having sketched the theoretical basis for the present contribution, an attempt is now made at illustrating how the joint forces of panchrony and equivalentization seem to have been at work behind the two standard expressions of futurity in English, that is, the *will* and the *be going to* constructions.

3. Historical considerations

If we were now to make use of the notions of panchrony and equivalentization in reference to futurity in English, we would need to describe the etymology (from where they come), semantics (what they mean) and the contexts (where they appear) behind the earliest possible attestations of the two main present-day English expressions of futurity. Also, it would be essential to show what the original expressions come to look like, semantically and contextually, in the course of the history of English, that is, how much and in what respect, if at all, the original expressions are different later, that is centuries after they were first recorded in English. In other words, the point is to trace the semantic development and contextual applications of the historical sources of the present-day expressions of futurity in selected texts and authors, such as, to give some examples, Chaucer (14th c.), Shakespeare (17th c.), the 19th century novels, etc.

As any detailed analysis of that kind and caliber exceeds the format of this study (for more, see among others Fischer & Rosenbach 2000; Hopper & Traugott 2003; Pérez 1990; Warner 1993; Wischer 2019), suffice it to say that the *will* construction goes back to the Old English verb *willan*, "the central senses [being] 'to will, intend, wish, be willing'" (Warner 1993: 167), whereas the *be going to* construction derives from the Old English verb *gān* 'go' (Bybee 2003: 146-147; Pérez 1990: 52-54; Scheffer 1975; Disney 2009; Traugott & Trausdale 2013: 104; Budts 2014), thus complying with the cross-linguistic observation that "movement verbs feature more prominently as sources [of futurity] than verbs or other lexical material of any other kind" (Bybee et al. 1994: 266). At a later stage, while in Chaucer the original Old English *willan*, the precursor of the present-day English *will* as a marker of futurity, does maintain its Old English import ('wish, desire') as much as it shows its (novel) auxiliary force of marking futurity, in Shakespeare, two centuries later, it basically functions only as a grammatical exponent of futurity. There is no unambiguous trace of the *be going to* construction in either Chaucer or Shakespeare.⁴ In Emily Bronte's *Wuthering heights*, another two centuries later, futurity can already be expressed with both *will* and *be going to*. This seems to be a well-established pattern in Dickens as well. As reported

by Disney (2009: 71) in his corpus-based scrutiny of four selected novels by Dickens, out of 348 instances of *be going to*, "the vast majority of the tokens [that is, 228 (65.5%)] are intention uses", whereas 16 tokens (6.5%) are ambiguous between intention and prediction. The transition stage, that is a change from the lexical *via* lexical-grammatical to grammatical dimensions of *will*, can be seen in the following quotations from Chaucer's "Prologue" to his *Canterbury tales* (see the text and translation at *Harvard's Geoffrey Chaucer website*):

(6) *In felaweshipe, and pilgrimes were they alle,*

*That toward Caunterbury **wolden** ryde. (ll. 26-27)*

[In fellowship, and they were all pilgrims,

Who **intended/were of a mind** to ride toward Canterbury.]

(7) *He **wolde** the see were kept for any thyng*

Bitwixe Middelburgh and Orewelle. (ll. 276-277)

[He **wanted** the sea to be guarded at all costs

Between Middelburgh (Holland) and Orwell (England).]

(8) *And at a knyght than **wol** I first bigynne. (l. 42)*

[And at a knight then **will** I first begin.]

(9) *Of cursyng oghte ech gilty man him drede,*

For curs wol slee right as assoillyng savith,

And also war hym of a Significavit. (ll. 660-663)

[Each guilty man ought to be afraid of excommunication,

For excommunication **will** slay just as forgiveness saves,

And let him also beware of a Significavit (order for imprisonment).]

As indicated in the corresponding modern English translations, while Chaucer's *wolde* and *wolden* in Examples 6 and 7 reflect the original meaning 'want, desire', Examples 8 and 9 point to the auxiliary function of *wol* as a marker of futurity.

4. Cognitive considerations

We can now try to identify the experiential/cognitive inferences that seem to have motivated the development of the original *gān* as a verb of motion and the original *willan* as a verb of volition into the standard expressions of futurity in English. This search of what it is in the group's collective experience that explains why the original expression now serves the novel purposes next to, or instead of, the old ones is precisely what we call panchrony. It seems plausible to assume that the experiential drives that have fueled the two changes in focus here are the following:

Panchronic Schema 1: The *will* construction projects futurity from experiencing desire, intention, determination, willpower in terms of the expected outcomes and effects, the focus being on the conceptualizer's overwhelming and irresistible appetite, craving or yearning for the event to happen. Desiring something means placing the object of desire already in the space of futurity, as if determination alone could project the course of coming events.

Panchronic Schema 2: The *be going to* construction projects futurity from experiencing purposiveness of an on-going activity in terms of a movement developing in space, the focus being on the conceptualizer's fixed and immediate objective. Heading for something means placing the object of what is being purposed already in the space of futurity, as if the directed purpose itself could project futurity.⁵

These schemata are panchronically-oriented in the sense that they reflect and accommodate those elements of the original conceptualizations of the respective source constructions (i.e., OE *willan* and OE *gān*) which can be said to have underlain, if not determined, their present-day *will* and *be going to* constructions as expressions of

futurity. In this reading, the schemata bring the past and the present together, and escape any clear-cut diachrony-synchrony opposition. In fact, the schemata avoid diachronic and synchronic considerations altogether, and are neither synchronic nor diachronic, nor both synchronic and diachronic. The reason is that both constructions are seen not as purely and exclusively linguistic developments but as ways of how futurity is conceptualized in terms of linguistic expressions. What matters in the first place is, then, the mentality that has brought the English to understand the world the way they do and show in their language, part of that being that futurity is conceptualized as movement forwards and as desire/intention, specific linguistic constructions being verbal expressions of that understanding.

These schemata are also examples of equivalentization in the sense that one entity comes to be conceptualized in terms of another entity, or, better, one entity is perceived as if it was (like) another entity, which is a typical case of conceptual metaphorization. Moreover, as our case involves a change from the lexical (L) to the grammatical (G), this is also a classical instance of grammaticalization. Naturally, these two mappings (i.e., metaphorization and grammaticalization) can be real only experientially, that is, there is no objective basis why L and G can be said to share so much that L can project into G, or G can derive from L. Still, experiential inferences, misunderstanding and ambiguity included, appear to suffice to bring L and G together. The net effect of metaphorization and grammaticalization is that, experientially, L and G are conceptual equivalents of each other. To use some real-world analogies, currency exchange, release on bail, fine (mulct) instead of imprisonment, cash instead of a prize, the water-ice-steam triad – in all of these one is an equivalent of the other without being the other, the equivalentization correspondences being subjective, experiential, and conceptual. So, no matter which of the metaphorical paths we are prepared to ultimately agree to postulate here (e.g., TIME IS MOTION > FUTURE IS MOVEMENT FORWARD, TIME IS CHANGE > FUTURE IS ANTICIPATED CHANGE, etc.),⁶ they all will relate some L and some G along the equivalentization cline. If so, both the *will* and *be going to* constructions have for good reasons been singled out to express futurity.

However, this all does not mean that we do not need to examine the role and place the two constructions play in present-day English, which, in fact, is asking a question of how *will* and *be going to*, respectively, are understood "here and now" if seen not as elements of the English lexical-grammatical system of related forms and meanings (which would amount to some version of a synchronic analysis), but as context-dependent effects, or active forces, by which the speakers of English can possibly produce changes in the world. This should not only confirm and profile our panchronic schemata, but also evidence them with specific extensions and elaborations.

5. Present-day considerations

Any full-length account of the panchronic schemata would have to include a whole array of present-day evidence, be it textual (preferably), or grammatical (i.e., as presented in grammar books), or lexicographic (i.e., as presented in dictionaries). For economy of space, it is the latter only that we have elucidated here.

For English, one suitable reference source for this lexicographic examination seems to be any of the dictionaries of "The big five", to use Béjoint's (2010: 164) label, which includes *Cambridge advanced learner's dictionary*, *Collins English dictionary*, *Longman dictionary of contemporary English*, *Macmillan English dictionary*, *Oxford advanced learner's dictionary*) in their online versions. Designed for advanced foreign learners, the dictionaries are expected to offer the formal and essential characteristics of the words/phrases/constructions in question, which are both general and specific enough to legitimize the conceptual correspondences captured in Panchronic Schemata 1 and 2. Moreover, the corpus-derived illustrative sentences that abound now in the Big Five provide an easy check on the generalizations offered.

5.1 Will: Dictionary explication

The following data is derived from the online edition of *Cambridge advanced learner's dictionary*, henceforth: *CALD* [accessed in September 2021]. On the basis of the *will*-entry in *CALD*, the following semantic elements can be considered as relevant for

establishing what the present-day speakers of English mean, or rather: what kind of futurity they project when they use the *will* construction. The explications and the examples are quoted verbatim from *CALD*, with our comments following, if relevant.

(10)

as a modal verb (FUTURE): used to talk about what is going to happen in the future, especially things that you are certain about or things that are planned:

Clare will be five years old next month.

The train leaves at 8:58, so we'll be in Scotland by lunchtime.

I'll see him tomorrow. / I'll be seeing him tomorrow.

Will Susie be there?

It won't be easy to find another secretary.

There'll be trouble when she finds out. (CALD)

Comment 1. Indeed, some of the examples do evidence the certainty of what it is to come (*Clare will be five years old next month; I'll see him tomorrow*), but most of them sound more like expected consequences inferred from what is known/given (*It won't be easy to find another secretary; The train leaves at 8:58, so we'll be in Scotland by lunchtime; There'll be trouble when she finds out*). This combination of certainty and expectation gives us, then, a paradoxical idea of futurity – certainty is expected and/or expectation is certain, both inferences being objectively impossible and self-contradictory. As much as certainty overrides expectation, expectation is elusive of certainty. Yet, the solution to the paradox comes with the notion of an unfolding plan; what bridges certainty and expectation is an intended/planned course of action. This is even better evidenced in the extra examples *CALD-online* provides in addition to those given above (see 10):

(11)

The doctor will call next week to check on your progress.

The choir will be performing the Hallelujah Chorus at the concert.

The photos will be ready for collection on Tuesday afternoon.

Representatives of the member states will be meeting next week.

All our computer equipment will be replaced in the near future. (CALD)

In all of these examples, the speaker can be certain about the things he/she communicates only as far as their expectations and intentions can evidence that. In this sense, the doctor may *not* call next week, the choir may *not* be performing, the photos may *not* be ready, etc. – there is no objective guarantee that they all will. Futurity remains to be, to repeat, an expected certainty.

Nevertheless, based on a panchronic account championed here, it is not isolated lexemes and constructions that matter, but the mentality that finds its expression in them. This means that we can safely refer to anything else in English that is encoded with the *will* element, be it a noun, or verb, a word, or a construction, in order to see how extensive and elaborate the whole *will*-related network of conceptualizations proves to be. In other words, the *will* construction, as a futurity expression, is expected to have much in common with, and be a product of, the same experience that has shaped some other *will*-based expressions.

With this in mind, *CALD-online* provides the following formal and semantic data on *will* used as a modal verb:

(12)

as a modal verb (ABLE/WILLING): used to talk about what someone or something is able or willing to do

I'll give you a lift.

Ask Gabriela if she'll take them.

I've asked her but she won't come.

The car won't start.

This lasagne will feed six people. (CALD)

(13)

as a modal verb (REQUEST): used to ask someone to do something:

Will you give me her address?

Will you give that to Tony when you see him, please? (CALD)

(14)

as a modal verb (REQUEST): used as a polite way of inviting someone to do something, or of offering someone something:

Will you join us for a cup of coffee, Evie?

Will you come in for a while?

You'll have some cake, won't you, Charlie? (CALD)

(15)

as a modal verb (LIKELY): used to refer to what is likely:

That'll be Scott at the door.

That'll be his mother with him.

As you all will know, election day is next week. (CALD)

(16)

as a modal verb (ORDER): used when angry to tell someone to do something:

Will you stop being such a pain!

You'll go upstairs and you'll go straight to bed like your father told you! (CALD)

Comment 2. Despite their independent labels (ORDER, REQUEST, LIKELY, etc.), the distinguished senses (12-16) do comply with the explication given already (see 10), and can, thus, be taken as specific subcases of Example 10. This is to say that they all project a kind of futurity, which is the interplay of certainty, expectation, and intention. For example, *I'll give you a lift* (12), *You'll have some cake, won't you, Charlie?* (14),

As you all will know, election day is next week (15), or *You'll go upstairs and you'll go straight to bed like your father told you!* (16) have as much of certainty of what it is that is going to happen as *I'll see him tomorrow* (10). No matter whether, for practical purposes and in actual situations, these expressions can best be grasped in terms of ability, likelihood, request, politeness, etc. (as in *CALD-online*), the certainty they impose is conditioned by the speaker's intentions, be they strong or weak, and expectations, be they well- or ill-grounded.

This is true not only of the declarative sentences (see 12-16), but of the interrogative ones as well. *Will you give me her address?* (13) and *Will you come in for a while?* (14) project future actions by requesting/ordering the addressee to perform them in the sense of this paradoxical intention-underlain expected certainty we have discovered above. Simply, that the addressee is requested to do something is, in fact, the addresser's intention that the addressee will do that what he/she is asked about. However tentative the addressee's satisfying the request is, the addresser is certain about that – naturally, proportionately to his/her expectations and intentions – and expresses it as a future development.

As the borderline between 'to intend' and the related senses 'to want', or even 'to desire', is a matter of degree, rather than quality, this brings us to the notion of **volition**. Let us mention that some of the *will* examples (12-16) can easily be reinterpreted in terms of 'to like/want/wish/desire'. And, thus, *I've asked her but she won't come* (11), *Will you give me her address?* (13), *Will you come in for a while?* (14), *You'll have some cake, won't you, Charlie?* (14) can all be understood as what one wants/does not want to do. So, *she won't come* because she does not want to come, and *Charlie will have some cake* because he does want to have it. Similarly, a request of *giv[ing] her address* and of *com[ing] in for a while* are, in fact, questions about whether or not the addressees want to do what they are asked to do.

A related observation can be made in reference to the non-modal senses *CALD-online* ascribes to the verb *will*:

(17)

(MAKE HAPPEN) If you will something to happen, you try to make it happen by the power of your thoughts:

She willed herself to remember his name. (CALD)

(18)

(formal) to want something:

Stay or go, as you will. (CALD)

(19)

(LEAVE) to arrange to give money or property to others after your death

She willed the house to her brother. [AmE]

She had willed her new husband all her property. [BussE] (CALD)

Comment 3. Again, what comes to the fore in these examples is what one wants to do, or what one desires to happen. As we understand the sentence in Example 17, under the circumstances, it may require much of her mental power, determination, and desire "to remember his name". The volition factor is also clear in Example 18: for one to stay or to go, one needs to decide which option it is that one wants to follow. So, what will actually happen, staying or going, is what one has decided one wants to do. Finally, that "she willed the house to her brother" (19) is a direct consequence of what she desired to choose to do; in order to will anything to her brother, she first must want to give him something. Although in none of these three examples do we have the modal *will*, still we can easily identify the same conceptual basis as in the *will* construction – what projects the course of actions in the future is that one wants them to happen.

Summary. We have found, then, some present-day confirmation of the panchronic import of our Schema 1: in the context of the *will*-based verbal expressions, the *will* construction projects futurity from experiencing a desire for the things to happen, or an intention of obtaining specific outcomes and effects. In present-day English, this may appear as a request, order, ability, likelihood, but the underlying mental attitude is that of volition. In other words, no matter whether a given action is requested, ordered, likely, or able (as indicated in the *CALD-online* entry of the modal verb *will*), it is first of all desired, which is enough to project it as a future action.

Now, that what has been done for the *will* construction is repeated below for the *be going to* construction.

5.2 Be going to: *EFL dictionary explication*

All the Big Five unanimously define *be going to* in terms of 'intention', with a possible addition of 'determination' (*CED-online*), or 'certainty' and 'expectation' (*CALD-online*). This makes the characteristic intention a default one and presents the others as contextual overtones of intention. Indeed, in the examples quoted in Example 20 below, one can detect various degrees of intention, from mere wishful thinking in Example 20a, and expectation in Examples 20b and 20c, to determination in Example 20d, and certainty in Example 20e.

(20)

(a) *I think it's going to be successful.* (CED)

(b) *There were clear expectations that he was going to step in.* (LDCE)

(c) *The radio said it was going to be hot and sunny tomorrow.* (CALD)

(d) *We're going to buy a house when we've saved enough money.* (OALD)

(e) *Don't worry. Everything's going to be all right.* (MED)

Comment 4. Intention is a matter of having a plan, setting a target, or achieving an aim, and, for that reason, it involves an activity directed forward, that is, ahead of where one currently stands. In other words, nothing is intended as long as there is no

subjective state of mind that conceptualizes that something may be done. This notion of a present-*versus*-future change/contrast, is not something that can be found in the *will*-construction, as evidenced above (10-19). In Example 20, however, that *something is going to be successful*, or that *somebody was going to step in*, or that *it was going to be hot (...)*, or that *somebody is going to buy a house*, or *everything is going to be all right*, is inferred from the actual situation in the present and conceptualized as virtually different in the future. As Dahl (1985: 103) would say, this kind of futurity resides in "extrapolation from the present state of the world". Thus, in relation to the actual point in time, we understand that something is not successful in Example 20a, somebody was not involved in Example 20b, it was neither hot nor sunny in Example 20c, somebody cannot afford a house in Example 20d, and not everything is all right in Example 20e. If, for the sake of experimenting, we replace *be going to* with *will*, we will project the futurity that will likewise have to do with the expectation/determination interplay but will not set the future in contrast with the present and will not depict the world as different from what it is now. *I think it will be successful* does not imply that something does not work now as much as *it will be hot and sunny tomorrow* does not mean that it is cold and cloudy today.

The *be going to* construction bridges then not so much the present and the future as the actual and the virtual, the latter being an intended and directed change from the former. This explains why this must be a verb of motion that serves the purposes of expressing this kind of (purposed and directed) futurity: time, change, motion consist in making a difference, none of the three can stand still (or if they do, there is no time, no change, and no motion). Yet, of the three, it is motion in space that appears most susceptible to sensory experience, time being an abstraction and change being underspecified or too general. The *be-going-to* kind of futurity, then, is a kind of change from the present, the change that is virtual because it feeds on the actual and cannot do without the actual.

Comment 5. It may be worth noting that the 'change' dimension of the verb *go* itself, a constituent element of the *be going to* construction, is well-recognized in some of the

Big Five dictionaries. Next to the expected attributes MOVE/TRAVEL or LEAVE, *LDCE-online* features *go* as CHANGE and HAPPEN, as in Example 21.

(21)

Her hair is starting to go grey.

He went crazy and tried to kill her.

I feel very encouraged by the way things are going. (LDCE)

The same can be found in *MED-online*, *go* being given such explications as "change to another condition (...)" and "happen in a particular way", etc. (22).

(22)

Louise had gone completely blind before she died.

I think the interview went very well. (MED)

In *CALD-online*, the same is worded in terms of "disappear or no longer exist" and "develop in a particular way" (23).

(23)

When I turned round the man had gone.

My exams went really badly. (CALD)

The most revealing evidence seems to be given in *CED-online*, where the 'change' aspect of *go* is identified with the synonyms *become*, *get*, *turn*, and explained as follows: "You can use *go* to say that a person or thing changes to another state or condition. For example, if someone *goes crazy*, they become crazy, and if something *goes green*, it changes colour and becomes green" (CED). Dahl (2000b: 351) finds this *be-become* correlation "quite natural" with respect to the future as it involves "the state itself [*be*] and the event that marks its beginning [*become*]". The 'happen' reading of *go*, in turn, can synonymously be expressed with *proceed*, *develop*, *turn out*, *work out*:

"You use *go* to talk about the way something happens. For example, if an event or situation *goes well*, it is successful" (CED).

Summary. The present-day English lexicographic evidence that can be given in support of the panchronic import of our Schema 2 has got to do with the intentional dimension of *be going to* as well as with the 'change' and 'happen' applications of *go* as a link verb. This intention of making a difference in the world, or, more descriptively, of causing things to change and/or happen, may be as weak as a general assumption or as strong as a firm conviction, but, whatever the case, it entails an on-going activity, as if the future was gradually coming out of the present. And the reason why the *be going to* construction should project the future is the underlying mentality of directing and purposing an activity away from the actual towards the virtual, which is probably an essence of any motion.

6. Conclusions

In what precedes, we have applied the notions of **panchrony** and **equivalentization** to the *will* and *be going to* constructions as two major expressions of **futurity** in **English**. The postulated driving mentalities behind the origin and development of these two have been suggested in terms of panchronic schemata and evidenced with both selected historical and present-day language material. However limited in its scope (futurity) and documentation (English), the analysis is believed to have some prospect of a successful application wherever the **world-views** that respective social groups have developed in their cross-generational collective experience are at stake.

Despite the fact that the notion of futurity seems manageable teaching- and translation-wise, it proves desirable to realize, and possibly reflect, what different mental attitudes have brought the speakers of English to express their "futures", and how these attitudes have found their ways to be encoded linguistically. This does, indeed, require a better and better understanding of that what can be found in language, and that is much more

than meanings – it is conceptualizations, mental pictures, experiential inferences that have over the years brought any single language to its present-day shape.

Notes

1. Cf. Carter and McCarthy's (2006: 630-631) discriminating factors of evidence and judgement in relation to, respectively, *be going to* and *will*.

2. This is not to deny that *be going to* is, indeed, "a historically transitional category [that is] becoming progressively grammaticalized, in that [...] historically containing the progressive aspect of the verb *go*, [it] no longer has the meaning associated with that form. Instead, it conveys futurity, typically associated with intention" (Biber et al. 1999: 1051; also see Aarts et al. 2014: 187).

3. The directionality of the language-culture relationship seems to be doomed to remain equivocal. For some, it is the language we speak that determines the way we behave, for some others it is just the other way round, and still others believe this works both ways (cf. Łozowski 2013). The approach we take in this article is conciliatory in the sense that we examine the point Lin has made that "language can potentially affect opinions or attitudes" (2019: 2) from the other end of the language-experience relationship – if, as *she* claims, grammar can and does trigger specific voting behaviour (ibid., 18), this is because, as *we* claim, specific experientially-grounded values have been encoded in grammar. For example, Lin concludes that the English imperfective and perfective expressions bring people to respond, respectively, negatively and positively to the candidate's electability (ibid., 18-19). In other words, political propaganda appears to be more successful if it is done in terms of actions conceptualized as completed and passive, rather than by means of actions conceptualized as on-going and dynamic (cf. Matlock 2012). In this way, in the context of making political choices, passivity and dynamicity escape exclusively linguistic considerations and become axiological values either cherished or disfavoured by voters. The same experience-grounded motivation applies to the use, or abuse, of other linguistic means for the sake of persuasion, be it political, social, or commercial, such as the passive voice (cf. Hopper 2015; Swaim 2016), pronouns (Alavidze 2017;

Alinezhad & Nemati 2019; Tyrkkö 2016), or imperatives and other devices/strategies (Lulu & Alkaff 2019).

4. On Pérez' (1990) count, out of the 27 instances of *be going to* in Shakespeare's complete works only 7 exhibit the infinitive (as in *Letters to my friends, And I am going to deliver them*), and in these "the point at which the implicit meaning of intention becomes explicitly conveyed is difficult to distinguish", the notion of prediction being "indeed a very late meaning" (ibid., 58). By contrast, Disney (2009) speaks of 29 instances of *be going to* in Shakespeare's complete works and seems to be confident to claim that "the new intention use arose", which he sees in "'movement to a place' extend[ing] to 'movement for a purpose'", as in *I am going to visit the prisoner. Fare you well* ("Measure for Measure" III.ii) (ibid., 66-67).

5. Cf. Fischer and Rosenbach on *be going to*: "[...] the change from a directional verb into a verb conveying future time was made possible by the fact that the verb 'go' in combination with a purposive infinitive invites the inference that the subject of 'go' arrives at a later time at the destination, with the result that the idea of a future plan becomes incorporated into the verb 'go (to)' itself" (2000: 17).

6. Cf. the following expressions: *time is running, time is passing by/slowly/fast, future is coming, in years to come/for a long time to come, the right to decide one's future, predict the future, foretell the future, plan for the future, there are some big changes on the horizon*.

Abbreviations

CALD – *Cambridge advanced learner's dictionary* (online edition)

CED – *Collins English dictionary* (online edition)

EFL – English as a foreign language

Eng. – English

Fr. – French

G – grammatical expressions

Ger. – German

Ital. – Italian

L – lexical expressions

LDCE – *Longman dictionary of contemporary English* (online edition)

MED – *Macmillan English dictionary* (online edition)

MWD – *Merriam-Webster dictionary* (online edition)

OALD – *Oxford advanced learner's dictionary* (online edition)

OE – Old English

Sp. – Spanish

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
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Résumé

The notions of panchrony and equivalentization are applied to the *will* and *be going to* constructions as two major expressions of futurity in English. Panchrony marks an attempt at obliterating the traditionally recognized distinction between synchrony and diachrony, while equivalentization is meant to question the allegedly arbitrary nature of language and, thus, grasp the human experiential capacity of bringing linguistic form and substance together in a motivated way. This motivation is understood as the cognitive inferences, driving mentalities, or, most broadly, the worldview that have operated behind the origin and development of the two futurity constructions in question. The generalizations are coined in terms of panchronic schemata, and the findings are evidenced with both selected historical and present-day language material. The latter includes the definitions and the illustrative sentences provided by selected dictionaries. The analysis is cognitively oriented and follows major tenets of cognitive linguistics, which is why it makes use of the notions of conceptual metaphor, grammaticalization, and conceptualization. In the analytical part, the traditionally recognized interplay of intention/volition and prediction in the *will* and *be going to*

constructions are given a novel (panchronic) interpretation, which is believed to facilitate further research into the genesis and growth of other expressions of futurity in English as well. Accordingly, the *will* construction is presented as projecting futurity from experiencing desire, intention, determination, and willpower in terms of the expected outcomes and effects, the focus being on the conceptualizer's overwhelming yearning for the event to happen. The *be going to* construction, in turn, projects futurity from experiencing purposiveness of an on-going activity in terms of a movement developing in space, the focus being on the conceptualizer's fixed and immediate objective.

Keywords: *be-going-to* future vs. *will* future, panchrony, equivalentization, grammaticalization, conceptualization, cognitive linguistics.